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JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT 
The Supreme Court has jurisdiction over this appeal 
pursuant to Article VIII, Section 3, Constitution of Utah, 
Section 78-2-2(3)(j), Utah Code Annotated 1953, as amended and 
Rules 3(a) and 4(a), Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure. 
ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
The following issues are presented for reviews: 
1. Did the district court error in holding that T. Lamar 
and Aletha Dewsnups1 (the "Dewsnups") counterclaim was 
"implicitly" disposed of by the summary judgment on the 
plaintiffs f claim. 
2. Did the district court error in denying the Dewsnups1 
motion to either reconsider and set aside the summary judgment 
or to certify the summary judgment as final? 
3. Did the district court error in denying the Dewsnups1 
motion to amend their counterclaim? 
STANDARD OF APPELLATE REVIEW 
1. Issue 1 - Correctness Standard. The first issue 
appeals the district court's interpretation of the summary 
judgment. Although such an interpretation can be a "finding 
of fact" where extrinsic evidence is considered in 
interpreting the judgment, in this case, where the court's 
interpretation was based solely on the pleadings, it is a 
"conclusion of law." Kimball v. Campbell, 699 P.2d 714, 716 
(Utah 1985); c.f. Williams v. Miller, 794 P.2d 23 (Utah 
App. 1990). Therefore, the appellate court will give no 
-2-
deference to the trial court's interpretation of the summary 
judgment, but will review it for correctness. Ron Case 
Roofing & Asphalt v. Blomquist, 773 P.2d 1382 (Utah 1989). 
2. Issue 2 - Correctness Standard. The second issue 
appeals the district court"s denial of the Dewsnups' motion to 
either reconsider and set aside the summary judgment or to 
certify it as final. The court based this denial on the 
conclusion of law that the Dewsnups' counterclaim had been 
"implicitly" disposed of by the summary judgment. (See the 
Memorandum Decision, attached hereto as Exhibit G). 
Ordinarily, where a matter is in the discretion of the 
district court, the district court's decision will not be 
overturned on appeal unless there is an abuse of discretion. 
Chadwick v. Nielsen, 763 P.2d 817 (Utah App. 1988). This is 
not true, however, where the court's decision is based on an 
erroneous legal conclusion. In such a case, the court will 
not give deference to the district court's decision but will 
use the correctness standard. Atchison, Topeka and Santa Fe 
Railway Company v. Marzuola, 418 P.2d 625, 627 (Okla. 1966); 
Hornback v. Missouri-Kansas-Texas Railroad Co., 3 95 P.2d 
379, 380 (Kan. 1964). In this case, because the district 
court's denial of the Dewsnups' motion was based on a legal 
conclusion, the correctness standard should be used. 
3. Issue 3 - Correctness Standard. The third issue 
appeals the district court's denial of the Dewsnups' motion to 
amend their counterclaim. Again, this decision was based on 
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the legal conclusion that the Dewsnups1 counterclaim had been 
disposed of, (See Memorandum Decision, attached hereto as 
Exhibit G). Consequently, as discussed above, the appellate 
court will not give deference to the district court's ruling, 
but will use the correctness standard. 
STATEMENT OF CASE 
The Dewsnups have suffered for 10 years for a debt which 
they did not owe. This is the first time that the Dewsnups 
will have their story heard. In 1978, the Dewsnups1 attorney 
loaned the Dewsnups money secured by a trust deed on their 
farm. After they had paid the debt in full in 1980, their 
attorney refused to release the trust deed and sued them on 
the trust deed for a debt which they did not owe and which was 
not secured by the trust deed. Their attorney then 
recommended another attorney to represent them in the 
litigation, who did not make any appearance (written or 
otherwise) on plaintiffs1 motion for summary judgment and 
summary judgment was granted against the Dewsnups. 
In order to try to save their farm the Dewsnups1 filed 
bankruptcy. However, the bankruptcy court sought only to 
eventually enforce a summary judgment that it presumed was 
correct. Since a state court decision is res judicate in 
bankruptcy court, the bankruptcy court could not reconsider 
the facts underlying the summary judgment. Sustained by the 
knowledge that they had paid off the mortgage, the Dewsnups 
persevered through 10 years of bankruptcy litigation, 
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believing that if they persevered long enough, somehow justice 
would prevail and they would get their farm back. 
Unfortunately, in the bankruptcy court litigation, all of the 
issues were mere "technicalities" toward the eventual 
enforcement of the summary judgment. Even if the Dewsnups1 
win their current appeal before the United States Supreme 
Court in their bankruptcy case, they will lose their farm. 
During the last 10 years the Dewsnups have not been able 
to farm their farm (on the advice of their bankruptcy 
counsel), have been reduced to poverty and have suffered 
enormously emotionally and physically. It is difficult to 
describe the emotional toll 10 years of bankruptcy 
litigation has had on this family, as they have tried to save 
the family farm. Many attribute LeMar Dewsnupfs premature 
death in 1986 to the ongoing stress of this litigation. As a 
result of borrowing money to pay the ever mounting legal fees, 
two of the Dewsnup children were eventually unable to repay 
the money they had borrowed and were also forced into 
bankruptcy. Alone and penniless in 1988, and having lost 
below in the bankruptcy and district courts, Aletha Dewsnup 
went through the town of Delta, Utah with a tin cup raising 
the $10,000 bond she needed to appeal to the Tenth Circuit. 
Sustained by the belief that if she tried hard enough, someday 
justice would prevail, Aletha Dewsnup never gave up hope. 
Aletha Dewsnup has tried hard enough, the Dewsnups never owed 
the debt for which they have been persecuted for 10 years, 
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and now is the time for justice to prevail. 
After the plaintiffs had filed their complaint against 
the Dewsnups, the Dewsnups filed a counterclaim against the 
plaintiffs. The plaintiffs moved for summary judgment on 
their claim and summary judgment was granted, but the 
Dewsnups1 counterclaim was never decided. 
When the Dewsnups filed bankruptcy, their counterclaim 
became an asset of the bankruptcy trustee and the Dewsnups 
were not able to pursue it. On January 6, 19 91, the 
bankruptcy trustee finally abandoned the counterclaim back to 
the Dewsnups. 
Having regained control of their counterclaim, on January 
22, 1991 the Dewsnups filed a motion to amend their 
counterclaim and a motion to either reconsider and set aside 
the summary judgment or to certify it as final, so that it 
could be appealed. Because the summary judgment had not 
disposed of all the claims in the case and had not been 
certified as final, under Rule 54(b) of the Utah Rules of 
Civil Procedure the summary judgment was still subject to 
revision. The court denied both motions, holding that the 
Dewsnups counterclaim had been "implicitly" disposed of by the 
summary judgment. From that holding the Dewsnups brought this 
appeal. 
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FACTS 
1. In the spring of 1980f the Dewsnups were farmers who 
owned a farm near Delta, Utah. LaMar Dewsnup's health was not 
good and the Dewsnups decided to purchase a motel as a way of 
eventually getting out of farming. (R. 90). 
2. The Dewsnups approached their attorney, Joseph 
Henroid, and asked him if he knew anyone that would lend them 
$119,000 as a down payment on a motel they were looking at. 
Joseph Henroid said that he would lend them part of the money 
from the Annette Jacob trust fund that he was trustee for and 
that he knew some other people that would lend them the rest. 
(R. 90-91). 
3. The Dewsnups and Joseph Henroid had agreed that the 
loan would be secured by 16 0 acres of farm land and certain 
water rights that the Dewsnups owned outright. (R. 62, 91, 
197). 
4. In June 1980, the Dewsnups borrowed $119,000 from 
Joseph Henroid, as trustee of the Annette Jacob Trust, and 
from the rest of the plaintiffs in this case (who were people 
that Joseph Henroid had contacted). (R. 91, 124, 199-200). 
5. Joseph Henroid and Earl Peck, one of the attorneys at 
Joseph Henroid1s law firm, drafted all of the loan documents. 
(R. 91, 125, 197). 
6. On or about June 1, 1978, the Dewsnups executed three 
promissory notes (the "Promissory Notes") in favor of the 
plaintiffs totaling $119,000. (R. 91, 124, 199-200). 
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7. At the same time, the Dewsnups executed a Trust Deed 
and an Amended Trust Deed (collectively, the "Trust Deed") to 
secure the Promissory Notes. (R. 91, 124, 199-200). 
8. Although the Dewsnups signed the Trust Deed assuming 
that it reflected their agreement with Joseph Henroid, it did 
not. Unbeknowst to the Dewsnups, the Trust Deed also included 
56.71 acres of land in Oak City, Utah that Aletha Dewsnup had 
been given as an inheritance. (R. 62, 91, 198). 
9. Also unbeknowst to the Dewsnups, as additional 
security for the Promissory Notes the Dewsnups executed an 
Assignment of Contract (the "Assignment of Contract"), 
assigning to the plaintiffs a security interest in a purchase 
contract (the "Purchase Contract") by which the Dewsnups were 
purchasing additional farm land. (R. 62, 91, 198). 
10. In 1976, the Dewsnups had entered into the Purchase 
Contract to purchase some additional farm land (sometimes 
referred to herein as the "Arrow Land") adjacent to the 160 
acres the Dewsnups owned from LaMar Dewsnup1s cousin, Richard 
Dewsnup (through his company—Arrow Investment Company), for 
$400,000 with annual installments for twenty years due on 
January 2 of each year. (R. 91-92, 125, 198-99). 
11. Title to the land being purchased under the Purchase 
Contract was held by an escrow agent under escrow 
instructions. (R. 183-84). 
12. The Purchase Contract gave the Dewsnups the right to 
terminate the Purchase Contract by failing to make any of the 
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annual installments due under the Purchase Contract on January 
2, by the following June 2 of that year: 
If Buyers default on the payment falling due on 
January 2f 1977, or any payment thereafter falling 
due, and if such sum or any part thereof remains 
in default for a period of five months, then 
Buyers shall forfeit any and all right, title and 
interest that they otherwise would have in and to 
the property covered by this agreement, title to 
which has not passed to Buyers at that time, and 
this agreement shall terminate. 
(Purchase Contract, pp. 5-6). (R. 153-54). 
13. If a January 2 payment due under the Purchase 
Contract was not paid by the next succeeding June 2, the 
escrow agent was instructed to return title to the land to the 
seller: 
Your instructions are to...release to the seller the 
warranty deed...if...the Buyers shall default in the 
payment of any sum falling due under the agreement 
and said sum or any part thereof remains in default 
for a period of five months. 
(Escrow Instructions, Paragraph 4). (R. 184). 
14. At the time the Dewsnups entered into the Purchase 
Contract the Intermountain Power Project ("IPP") was coming 
into the area and had driven up land prices and the $400,000 
purchase price reflected the inflated real estate market at 
the time, which proved to be too high. (R. 92). 
15. In 1980, two years after the $119,000 loan had been 
made, LaMar Dewsnup's health was getting worse, and property 
values were declining. The Dewsnups decided to let the land 
they were purchasing under the Purchase Contract go back so 
LaMar would have less land to farm. (R. 92, 125, 200). 
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16. On June 2, 1980, the Dewsnups exercised their 
contractual right under the Purchase Contract and terminated 
the Purchase Contract by failing to make the January 2, 1980 
payment by June 2, 1980. Therefore, the Purchase Contract 
terminated according to its terms, the escrow agent delivered 
title to the land back to LaMar Dewsnup's cousin as provided 
in the escrow instructions, and the Dewsnups voluntarily 
forfeited all of their right, title and interest in the Arrow 
Land. (R. 92, 125, 200-01). 
17. Five days later, on June 7, 1980 and over the 
Dewsnups' objections, Joseph Henroid made the January 2, 1980 
payment of $4 9,96 6.21 on the Purchase Contract, even though it 
was too late. (R. 92, 125-26, 201). (See the Demand for 
Reimbursement attached hereto as Exhibit A). 
18. The plaintiffs demanded that the Dewsnups reimburse 
them the $49,966.21 that Joseph Henroid had paid on the 
Purchase Contract. (R. 92, 126, 201). (See Exhibit A). 
19. The Assignment of Contract required the Dewsnups to 
reimburse the plaintiffs for payments made by the plaintiffs 
"under and pursuant to the Purchase Contract": 
[The Dewsnups] agree that in the event they are in 
default that [plaintiffs] may make the payments due 
under and pursuant to [the Purchase Contract] and 
will be reimbursed for the same by [the Dewsnups]. 
(Assignment of Contract, Paragraph 4). (R. 145). 
20. The Dewsnups refused to do so, believing that they 
were not legally required to do so since the Purchase Contract 
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had terminated before Joseph Henroid had made the payments and 
therefore Joseph Henorid's payments could not have been made 
"under and pursuant to" the Purchase Contract. (R. 92, 126). 
21. On June 1, 1980, the $119,000 loan came due. 
(R. 8-10). 
22. On September 16, 1980, the plaintiffs filed a 
complaint against the Dewsnups to foreclose on the Trust Deed 
for the non-payment of the $119,000 loan. (R. 1-7). (A copy 
of the complaint is attached hereto as Exhibit B). 
23. About this time, Joseph Henroid told the Dewsnups 
that he could no longer be their lawyer and recommended a 
lawyer in Provo. The Dewsnups hired the lawyer he suggested, 
who filed an answer and counterclaim on November 21, 1980. 
(R. 59-63, 93). (A copy of the answer and counterclaim is 
attached hereto as Exhibit B). 
24. The counterclaim alleged that Joseph Henroid and 
Earl J. Peck had breached their fiduciary duty to the Dewsnups 
by failing to disclose that the Trust Deed included more than 
the 160 acres agreed upon and that the Assignment of Contract 
assigned the plaintiffs a security interest in the Purchase 
Contract. The counterclaim requested a reformation of the 
Trust Deed and the Assignment of Contract to conform with the 
representations Joseph Henroid made to the Dewsnups as to the 
legal effect of those documents at the time the $119,000 loan 
was made. (R. 61-63). 
25. In December, 1980, the Dewsnups sold the motel and 
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paid in full all principal and interest due and owing on the 
$119,000 loan ($151,013.89) and asked that the Trust Deed be 
reconveyed. (R. 93f 126, 202). 
26. The plaintiffs refused to release the Trust Deed 
unless they were reimbursed for the $4 9,966.21 payment Joseph 
Henroid had made. (R. 93, 126-27, 202). 
27. The Trust Deed only secured the Promissory Notes, 
and did not secure payments made under the Assignment of 
Contract: 
[The] trustor conveys and warrants to trustee 
in trust with power of sale, following described 
property...for the purpose of securing payment 
of the indebtedness evidence by a promissory note 
of even date herewith, in the principal sums of 
$33,000; 56,000 and 30,000, made by Trustor, 
payable to the order of Beneficiary at the times, 
in the manner and with interest as thereon set forth, 
and any extensions and/or renewals or modifications 
thereof. 
(Trust Deed, p. 1). (R. 133, 138). 
28. Notwithstanding the fact that the $4 9,966.21 debt, 
even if valid, was not secured by the Trust Deed, on March 3, 
1981 the plaintiffs filed a motion to foreclose on the Trust 
Deed, for the $4 9,966.21 payment and filed an affidavit in 
support thereof. (R. 66-70). (Copies of the Motion for 
Summary Judgment and the Affidavit of Louis L. Timm are 
attached hereto as Exhibits D and E, respectively). 
29. Neither plaintiffs1 motion for summary judgment nor 
the affidavit filed in support thereof either mentioned the 
counterclaim or any of the issues raised in the counterclaim. 
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(R. 66-70). (See Exhibits C and D). 
30. When the plaintiffs1 motion for summary judgment was 
scheduled to be heard, the Dewsnups1 new attorney failed to 
appear at the hearing and summary judgment was granted against 
the Dewsnups. (R. 73-74). 
31. On April 22, 1981f Judge Harlan Burns signed the 
Summary Judgment and Decree of Foreclosure (sometimes referred 
to herein as the "summary judgment"). (R. 75-79) (A copy of 
the Summary Judgment and Decree of Foreclosure is attached 
hereto as Exhibit F). 
32. The Summary Judgment and Decree of Foreclosure did 
not mention the counterclaim or any of the issues raised in 
the counterclaim. (R. 75-79) (See Exhibit F). 
33. The Summary Judgment and Decree of Foreclosure also 
did not specify that it was a final judgment for purposes of 
Rule 54(b) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. (R. 75-79). 
(See Exhibit F). 
34. With the summary judgment in hand, the plaintiffs 
began proceedings to foreclose on the Dewsnups1 farm to 
recover the $49,966.21 payment. Because the plaintiffs 
refused to release the Trust Deed, the Dewsnups were unable to 
finance the farm debts which were coming due. The Dewsnups1 
new lawyer advised them that their only hope to save the 
family farm was to file for bankruptcy, which they did. It 
was not until many years later that the Dewsnups reviewed the 
court records and learned that their new lawyer had never 
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appeared at the hearing on plaintiffs' motion for summary 
judgment. (R. 93-94). 
35. Although the bankruptcy allowed the Dewsnups to 
forestall foreclosure on their farm, upon filing bankruptcy, 
their counterclaim became the property of the bankruptcy 
trustee and the Dewsnups were barred from pursuing it. 
(R. 95-97). 
36. As a result of summary judgment being erroneously 
granted 10 years ago and plaintiffs' refusal to reconvey the 
Trust Deed, the Dewsnups have suffered enormous financial, 
emotional and physical losses through 10 years of bankruptcy 
litigation. Many attribute LaMar Dewsnup's premature death in 
1986 to the ongoing stress of this litigation. Aletha Dewsnup 
has been reduced to a virtual pauper. She now works odd jobs 
to try to pay the enormous legal bills that have accumulated. 
For nearly 10 years now, the farm has lain dormant. The 
Dewsnups have not farmed the land on the advice of their 
bankruptcy counsel. (R. 94, 203). 
37. The Dewsnups1 bankruptcy case is finally nearing an 
end. Their case is currently before the United States Supreme 
Court on a bankruptcy issue and will be heard during October 
term. Even if the Dewsnups win their appeal before the United 
States Supreme Court they will probably still lose their farm, 
since they will have to redeem the farm for $3 9,000 which they 
currently do not have. (R. 262-282). 
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38. On December 14, 1990, the bankruptcy trustee 
published a notice of intention to abandon the Dewsnups1 
counterclaim and on January 6, 1991, the bankruptcy trustee 
abandoned the Dewsnups1 counterclaim. (R. 103-105). 
39. With the counterclaim abandoned, on January 22, 
1991, the Dewsnups filed a motion to amend the counterclaim, 
in order to proceed forward to a final adjudication of the 
counterclaim. (R. 194-207), 
40. On January 22, 1991, the Dewsnups also filed a 
motion to either reconsider and set aside the Summary Judgment 
and Foreclosure Decree, or to certify it as final pursuant to 
Rule 54(b) so that the Dewsnups could appeal it. 
(R. 107-109). 
41. On February 21, 1991, Judge Ray M. Harding denied 
both motions, holding that the Summary Judgment and 
Foreclosure Decree had "implicitly" disposed of the Dewsnups1 
counterclaim. (R. 348-349). (A copy of the Memorandum 
Decision is attached hereto as Exhibit G). 
42. On March 11, 1991, Judge Ray M. Harding entered a 
Order Denying Defendant Dewsnups Motion to Amend Counterclaim, 
Reconsider or Certify as Final. (R. 350-51). (A copy thereof 
is attached hereto as Exhibit H). 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
The Dewsnups counterclaim was not disposed of by the 
summary judgment because it was not mentioned in the motion 
for summary judgment, in the affidavit in support of the 
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motion for summary judgment or in the summary judgment itself. 
Furthermore, any disposition of the Dewsnups1 counterclaim 
would have been without notice to the Dewsnups and therefore 
would have been in violation of due process and in violation 
of Rule 56(c) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. 
Because the Dewsnups1 counterclaim was not disposed of, 
and because the summary judgment was not certified as final at 
the time it was entered, under Rule 54(b) of the Utah Rules of 
Civil Procedure the summary judgment was not a "final 
judgment" and is subject to revision. Because the summary 
judgment was erroneously granted, it should be set aside. If 
not set aside, it should be certified as final pursuant to 
Rule 54(b) so that it can be appealed. 
Finally, under Rule 15 of the Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure the Dewsnups1 should have been allowed to amend 
their counterclaim toward a final adjudication thereof. 
ARGUMENT 
I 
THE DEWSNUPS1 COUNTERCLAIM HAS NOT BEEN ADJUDICATED. 
A. UNDER RULE 54(b) OF THE UTAH RULES OF 
CIVIL PROCEDURE, THE DEWSNUPS1 COUNTERCLAIM 
WAS NOT DISPOSED OF BY THE SUMMARY JUDGMENT. 
The summary judgment only granted judgment on the 
plaintiffs1 complaint and never mentioned the counterclaim or 
any of the issues raised in the counterclaim. Nevertheless, 
Judge Harding held that the counterclaim was "implicitly" 
disposed of by the summary judgment. 
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That holding is contrary to Rule 54(b) of the Utah Rules 
of Civil Procedure which governs the disposition of multiple 
claim cases. Rule 54(b) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure 
allows for the partial disposition of claims in a multiple 
claims case. However, Rule 54(b) of the Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure also requires that such claims be "expressly" 
disposed of: 
When more than one claim for relief is presented 
in an action, whether as a claim, counterclaim, 
cross-claim, or third-party claim, and/or when 
multiple parties are involved, the court may 
direct the entry of a final judgment as to one or 
more but fewer than all of the claims or parties 
only upon an express determination by the court 
that there is no just reason for delay and upon 
an express direction for the entry of judgment. 
In the absence of such determination and 
direction, any order or other form of decision, 
however designated, which adjudicates fewer than 
all the claims or the rights and liabilities of 
fewer than all the parties shall not terminate 
the action as to any of the claims or parties.... 
Prior to the 1946 amendments to Rule 54(b) of the Federal 
Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 54(b) of the Federal Rules of 
Civil Procedure provided for partial disposition of claims in 
a multiple-claim case, but did not require that such a 
disposition had to be "express." Rule 54(b) of the Federal 
Rules of Civil Procedure only provided that "[t]he judgment 
shall terminate the action with respect to the claim so 
disposed of and the action shall proceed on the remaining 
claims." 10 C. Wright, A. Miller and M. Kane, Federal 
Practice and Procedure, Section 2653, at 20 (1983). 
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The problem that arose was that whenever one claim in a 
multiple claim case was disposed of, the claimants did not 
know whether other claims had been implicitly disposed of. 
Consequently, the claimants had to either appeal the judgment, 
or risk losing the right of appeal if their claim had been 
implicitly disposed of: 
Several problems arose in interpreting the original 
language of Rule 54(b) .... An order striking one 
of several counts of a complaint, although it might 
appear to be merely a pleading ruling, could turn 
out to have been a judgment terminating the action 
with respect to a separate claim. The party 
adversely affected by the order was forced either 
to appeal immediately and run the risk of having 
it dismissed as premature or to proceed with the 
action and take a chance on losing the right to 
have the order reviewed because of the expiration 
of the time for appeal. 
10 C. Wright, A. Miller and M. Kane, Federal Practice and 
Procedure, pp. 21-22 (1983). 
Consequently, in 1946 Rule 54(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil 
Procedure was amended to require the court to make an 
"express" determination so that the parties would know which 
claims had and had not been disposed of. 
In this case, to hold that the Dewsnups1 counterclaim was 
"implicitly" disposed of by the summary judgment would put 
every claimant in the untenable position of having to appeal 
every disposition of any claim in a multiple claim case on the 
chance that a court would later hold (as Judge Harding did) 
that their claim had been implicitly disposed of and the time 
for appeal had run. This is exactly the problem the 1946 
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amendments to Rule 54(b) were designed to eliminate. 
In Lamp v. Andrus, 657 F.2d 1167 (10th Cir. 1981), the 
Tenth Circuit considered whether a claim could be "implicitly" 
disposed of under Rule 54(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil 
Procedure, In that case, the plaintiff had filed claims 
against multiple defendants, and the claims against one 
defendant had been dismissed. The other defendants later 
argued that the dismissal had implicitly dismissed the claims 
against them as well. The Tenth Circuit rejected that 
argument, stating that Rule 54(b) does not contemplate the 
"implicit adjudication" of claims: 
First, Rule 54(b) requires an "express 
determination" and "express direction" for 
entry of a judgment adjudicating fewer than all 
the claims of the parties. Any other judgment, 
"however designated" will not satisfy Rule 54(b)'s 
requirement. Second, the purpose of Rule 54(b) 
is to limit ambiguity as to the appealability of 
the judgments entered during the course of 
litigation involving multiple claims or multiple 
parties. To require a reviewing court to consider 
the intentions of the district judge, in the face 
of and contrary to an explicit judgment, would 
not help to further maintain clearly defined rules 
of appellate jurisdiction. Rule 54(b), therefore, 
does not contemplate "implicit adjudication" of 
claims. 
Id. at 1169. (Emphasis added). 
Rule 54(b) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure is 
patterned after Rule 54(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil 
Procedure. The Utah courts often look to the intent behind 
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure in interpreting Utah 
Rules of Civil Procedure that have been patterned thereafter. 
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State v. Kay, 717 P.2d 1294, 1299 (Utah 1986); Nelson v. 
Stoker, 669 P.2d 392-93 (Utah 1983). 
To hold that the Dewsnups counterclaim had been 
"implicitly" disposed of would create the very problem that 
1946 amendment to Rule 54(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil 
Procedure was intended to eliminate. Under Rule 54(b) of the 
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, which is identical to Rule 
54(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, the Dewsnups1 
counterclaim could not have been "implicitly" disposed of by 
the summary judgment. 
B. UNDER THE GENERAL RULES GOVERNING THE 
INTERPRETATION OF JUDGMENTS, THE DEWSNUPS1 
COUNTERCLAIM WAS NOT DISPOSED OF BY THE 
SUMMARY JUDGMENT. 
The summary judgment only grants judgment on the claim 
made in plaintiffs1 complaint, and never mentions the 
counterclaim or any of the issues raised in the counterclaim. 
Nevertheless, Judge Harding held that the summary judgment had 
"implicitly" disposed of the Dewsnups counterclaim. 
That holding is contrary to the general rules governing 
the interpretation of judgments. A judgment is subject to 
"construction according to the rules that apply to all written 
instruments." Park City Utah Corp. v. Ensign Co., 586 
P.2d 446, 450 (Utah 1978). Consequently, where the language 
of a judgment is "clear and ambiguous" it will be interpreted 
"as it speaks." Ld. In this case, it is "clear and 
ambiguous" that the summary judgment did not dispose of the 
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Dewsnups1 counterclaim because the summary judgment never 
purported to adjudicate the Dewsnups1 counterclaim, never even 
mentioning the counterclaim or any of the issues raised 
therein. 
In Redding v. Powell, 452 So.2d 132 (Fla. Dist. Ct. 
App. 1984), the court held that where the counterclaim was not 
"specifically mentioned or referred to" in the summary 
judgment on the plaintiffs claim, the counterclaim was not 
disposed of: 
[W]e hold that summary judgment did not dispose 
of appellant's counterclaim because the record 
indicates that neither appellee's motion for 
summary judgment nor the court's order specifically 
mentions or referred to the counterclaim. 
Id. at 135. 
In this case, neither the motion for summary judgment, the 
affidavit in support of the motion for summary judgment nor 
the summary judgment itself "specifically (or unspecifically) 
mention or refer to the counterclaim." 
Furthermore, where a document is "clear and unambiguous", 
a party cannot "create" an ambiguity through the introduction 
of extrinsic evidence. The ambiguity, if it exists, must be 
evident from the instrument itself. Ron Case Roofing & 
Asphalt v. Blomquist, 773 P.2d 1382, 1385 (Utah 1989). The 
fact that an instrument is silent on one particular issue does 
not by itself create an ambiguity, rather it is presumed that 
the instrument was not intended to address that issue. Hal 
Taylor Associates v. Union America, Inc. 657 P.2d 743, 749 
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(Utah 1982). The existence of the Dewsnups1 counterclaim does 
not by itself create an ambiguity in the summary judgment. 
Rather, the presumption is that the summary judgment was not 
intended to address the Dewsnups1 counterclaim. 
If the summary judgment is determined to be ambiguous, 
"the entire record" may be resorted to for the purpose of 
construing the judgment. Park City Utah Corp. v. Ensign 
Co., 586 P.2d 446, 450 (Utah 1978). In this case, when the 
entire record is resorted to the record shows that plaintiffs 
did not request summary judgment on the Dewsnups1 
counterclaim, and that the plaintiffs' did not mention any of 
the issues raised in the Dewsnups1 counterclaim in their 
motion for summary judgment or in the affidavit in support 
thereof. Given this, how can the summary judgment (which does 
not mention the counterclaim) be construed to have disposed of 
the counterclaim when a motion for disposition of the 
counterclaim was never made and when neither the counterclaim 
nor any of the issues raised in the counterclaim were before 
the court? When the "entire record" is reviewed, it is clear 
that the summary judgment did not dispose of the counterclaim. 
Finally, a well recognized rule of construction is that a 
"document...drawn up by [a party] through their 
attorney...should be strictly construed against them." 
Guinand v. Walton 450 P.2d 467, 469 (Utah 1969). In this 
case, the summary judgment was drafted by the plaintiffs' 
attorney. Had the plaintiffs thought that the counterclaim 
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was disposed of by the summary judgment, surely they would 
have so stated in the summary judgment which they drafted. 
Plaintiffs should not now be allowed to benefit by arguing 
that the summary judgment (which they drafted) is ambiguous 
and thus deprive the Dewsnups of their counterclaim. 
C. ANY DISPOSITION OF THE DEWSUPS1 COUNTER-
CLAIM WOULD HAVE BEEN WITHOUT NOTICE, AND 
THEREFORE IN VIOLATION OF DUE PROCESS. 
Both Amendment XIV, Section 1 of the United States 
Constitution and Article I, Section 7 of the Utah Constitution 
provide that no person shall be deprived of "life, liberty or 
property, without due process of law." The Dewsnups 
counterclaim is "property" within the meaning of those 
sections. Buttrey v. Guaranteed Securities, 300 P. 1040, 
1045, (Utah 1931); 16C C.J.S. Constitutional Law, Section 
984 nn. 92-93 (1985). Consequently, the Dewsnups cannot be 
deprived of their counterclaim without due process of law. 
Due process requires thcit before a person can be deprived 
of their property, they must be given notice of any action 
that will deprive them of their property and that notice must 
be "reasonably calculated" to "apprise [that person] of the 
pendency of the action and afford them an opportunity to 
present their objections:" 
An elementary and fundamental requirement of due 
process in any proceeding which is to be 
accorded finality is notice reasonably 
calculated, under all the circumstances, to 
apprise interested parties of the pendency of 
the action and afford them an opportunity to 
present their objections. The notice must be 
of such nature as reasonably to convey the 
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required information and it must afford a 
reasonable time for those interested to make 
their appearance [Citations omitted]. 
Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306, 
314, 70 S. Ct. 652, 657, 94 L.Ed. 865 (1950). 
Consequently, the Utah Supreme Court has held that notice of a 
hearing must "adequately inform the parties of the specific 
issues they must be prepared to meet:" 
To satisfy an essential requisite of procedure 
due process, a 'hearing1 must be prefaced by 
timely notice which adequately informs the 
parties of the specific issues they must 
prepare to meet. [Citation omitted]. 
Nelson v. Jacobsen, 669 P.2d 1207, 1213 (Utah 1983). 
"Thus, where notice is ambiguous or inadequate to inform a 
party of the nature of the proceedings against him or her, a 
party is deprived of due process." W. & G. Co. v. 
Redevelopment Agency, 802 P.2d 755, 762 (Utah App. 1990). 
For example, in Nelson v. Jacobsen, 669 P. 2d 1207, 1213-14 
(Utah 1983), the court held that where notice was given for a 
"hearing" instead of for a "trial", the notice was inadequate 
to satisfy due process and the subsequent trial was invalid. 
In this case, no notice at all was given to the Dewsnups 
that their counterclaim was to be adjudicated. Neither the 
motion for summary judgment nor the affidavit in support of 
the motion for summary judgment mentioned the Dewsnups1 
counterclaim. Similarly, neither the motion for summary nor 
the affidavit in support of the motion for summary judgment 
mentions any of the issues raised in the counterclaim. 
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Plaintiff's motion for summary judgment did not "inform 
the [Dewsnups] of the specific issues they must prepare to 
meet." Nelson at 1213. The counterclaim wasn't even 
mentioned. The notice in this case wasn't even "ambiguous or 
misleading", it was silent. If a notice is insufficient in 
Nelson because it gives notice for a "hearing" rather than a 
"trial", then the notice in this case is insufficient where it 
gives .no notice at all that the Dewsnups counterclaim was to 
be adjudicated. In Nelson, the court stated that "[t]imely 
and adequate notice and an opportunity to be heard in a 
meaningful way are the very heart of procedural fairness." 
Id. at 1211. In this case, the Dewsnups had no notice and 
consequently no opportunity to be heard on their counterclaim. 
Consequently, even if the summary judgment did dispose of the 
Dewsnups' counterclaim, the adjudication of the counterclaim 
must be reversed since it was done in violation of due 
process. 
D. ANY DISPOSITION OF THE DEWSNUPS' COUNTER-
CLAIM WOULD HAVE BEEN WITHOUT NOTICE, AND 
THEREFORE IN VIOLATION OF RULE 56(c) OF 
THE UTAH RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE. 
Rule 56(c) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure provides 
that where a motion for summary judgment is filed with the 
court, "[t]he motion shall be served at least 10 days before 
the time fixed for hearing." In this case, neither 
plaintiffs' motion for summary judgment nor plaintiffs' 
affidavit in support thereof either mention the counterclaim 
or mention any of the issues raised in the counterclaim. 
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Therefore, any disposition of the counterclaim would have been 
without notice to the Dewsnups. 
As a general rule, a summary judgment entered without the 
notice required by Rule 56(c) is invalid: 
Rule 56(c)...provides that a motion for summary 
judgment shall be served at least 10 days before 
the hearing date....Noncompliance with this time 
provision of the rule deprives the court of 
authority to grant summary judgment [Citation 
omitted]. 
Dolese v. United States, 541 F.2d 853, 854 (10th Cir. 1976). 
See also, 10 C. Wright, A. Miller and M. Kane, Federal 
Practice and Procedure, Section 2719, at 6-8 (1983). 
In considering the Rule 56(c) notice requirement, the 
Utah Supreme Court has held that "substantial compliance" is 
sufficient. Walker v. Rocky Mountain Recreation Co., 508 
P.2d 538 (Utah 1973) (holding 9 days notice was in 
"substantial compliance" to Rule 56(c)). Furthermore, the 
Utah Supreme Court has held that the Rule 56(c) notice 
requirement can be waived where both parties are present. 
Walker States Thrift & Loan Co. v. Blomquist, 504 P.2d 1019 
(Utah 1972); Security Title Co. v. Payless Builders Supply, 
407 P.2d 141 (Utah 1965). Neither of those exceptions apply 
in this case since no notice was given at all and neither the 
Dewsnups nor their attorney attended the hearing. 
When notice is given pursuant to the Rules of Civil 
Procedure, the adequacy of the content of the notice has been 
analyzed by the court under the due process analysis reviewed 
above. Seef e.g, Nelson v. Jacobsen 669 P.2d 1207 (Utah 
1983). Consequentlyf a notice given pursuant to Rule 
56(c) that is "ambiguous" or "inadequate to inform a party of 
the specific issues they must be prepared to meet" fails to 
satisfy Rule 56(c) as well as fails to satisfy due process. 
For the reasons discussed in the foregoing section, the 
plaintiffs did not give the Dewsnups the notice required by 
Rule 56(c) that their counterclaim was subject to 
adjudication. 
Because notice was not given as required under Rule 56(c) 
of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, the Dewsnups1 
counterclaim could not have been disposed of by the summary 
judgment, even if the summary judgment had expressly disposed 
of the Dewsnups1 counterclaim (which it did not). This case 
is similar to two cases from other jurisdiction in which the 
lower court had expressly disposed of a counterclaim, even 
though it was not mentioned in the motion for summary 
judgment. In both cases the appellate court reversed relying 
on the fact that the notice required by the applicable rule of 
civil procedure had not been given. In Faussner v. Waver, 
432 So.2d 100 (Fla. Dist. Ct. 1983) the court reversed the 
summary judgment as to the counterclaim where the "summary 
judgment on the counterclaim was not addressed by any motion 
and [therefore] there was no notice to [the counterclaimant]". 
Id. at 102. Similarly, in Production Credit Association 
v. Davidson, 444 N.W.2d 339 (N.D. 1989) the court reversed 
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the summary judgment as to the counterclaim where "PCA did not 
make a motion to dismiss the counterclaim [and] PCA did not 
refer to the issues raised in the counterclaim in its motion 
for summary judgment, the brief and the affidavit." Id. at 
346. 
Because the plaintiffs did not give the Dewsnups notice 
that their counterclaim was to be before the court on summary 
judgment as required by Rule 56(c) of the Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure, even if the summary judgment did dipose of the 
counterclaim, the adjudication of the Dewsnups1 counterclaim 
must be reversed since it was done in violation of Rule 56(c). 
II 
THE SUMMARY JUDGMENT SHOULD HAVE BEEN EITHER 
RECONSIDERED AND SET ASIDE OR CERTIFIED AS FINAL. 
A. THE SUMMARY JUDGMENT MAY BE RECONSIDERED UNDER 
RULE 54(b). 
Because the summary judgment did not dispose of all the 
claims in this case and because the trial court did not 
certify that judgment as "final" pursuant to Rule 54(b) of the 
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, under Rule 54(b) of the Utah 
Rules of Civil Procedure that judgment is "subject to revision 
at any time before the entry of judgment adjudicating all 
claims and the rights and liabilities of all the parties:" 
When more than one claim for relief is presented 
in an action, whether as a claim, counterclaim, 
cross-claim, or third-party claim, and/or when 
multiple parties are involved, the court may 
direct the entry of a final judgment as to one 
or more but fewer than all of the claims or parties 
only upon an express determination by the court 
that there is no just reason for delay and upon 
an express direction for the entry of judgment. 
In the absence of such determination and direction, 
any order or other form of decision, however 
designated, which adjudicates fewer than all the 
claims or the rights and liabilities of fewer than 
all the parties shall not terminate the action as to 
any of the claims or parties, and the order or other 
form of decision is subject to revision at any time 
before the entry of judgment adjudicating all the 
claims and the rights and liabilities of all the 
parties. 
When the Court entered the summary judgment, it only ruled on 
the plaintiffs' claim, and not on the Dewsnups1 counterclaim. 
Furthermore, the court did not certify the summary judgment 
as a "final judgment" for purposes of Rule 54(b). 
Consequently, under Rule 54(b) the summary judgment is 
"subject to revision at any time before the entry of judgment 
adjudicating all the claims and the rights and liabilities of 
all the parties." 
Because the summary judgment did not dispose of all the 
claims in this case and was not certified as "final", the 
Dewsnups did not have a right to appeal the summary judgment 
when it was entered. Rule 3 of the Utah Rules of Appellate 
Procedure only provides a right of appeal from "final 
judgments." (formerly Rule 72(a) of the Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure). 
The problem the Dewsnups faced when the summary judgment 
was entered was the same problem the appellants faced in 
Kennedy v. New Era Industries, Inc., 600 P.2d 534 (Utah 
1979). In Kennedy, the trial court granted summary judgment 
on several, but not all claims. When an appeal was taken on 
the summary judgment, the Utah Supreme Court refused to take 
jurisdiction since the summary judgment did not dispose of all 
the claims and since the summary judgment was "entered by the 
trial court without a Rule 54(b) [final judgment] 
determination," and therefore it was not a "final judgment." 
.Id. at 536. 
Therefore, when the Dewsnups filed their motion to either 
reconsider and set aside or to certify as final, what they 
were requesting was identical to the request made in Salt 
Lake City Corp. v. James Constructors, 761 P.2d 42 (Utah 
App. 1988). In that case, summary judgment was granted 
against the plaintiff on some but not all of its claims. 
Sixteen months later the plaintiff moved the court to either 
reconsider its earlier summary judgment as allowed under Rule 
54(b), or to certify its earlier summary judgment as "final 
pursuant to Rule 54(b)" so that it could be appealed. Id. 
at 43-44. In that case, the court chose to certify its 
earlier summary judgment as final, and the plaintiff was able 
to appeal that summary judgment. In this case, having held 
that the summary judgment "implicitly" disposed of the 
counterclaim, and therefore was a final judgment at the time 
it was entered, the district court refused to either 
reconsider and set aside the summary judgment or to certify it 
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as final pursuant to Rule 54(b), Once this court has held 
that the Dewsnups1 counterclaim was not "implicitly" disposed 
of, then under Rule 54(b) the summary judgment is "subject to 
revision" because it did not dispose of all the claims in this 
case and was not certified as final, 
B. THE SUMMARY JUDGMENT SHOULD BE RECONSIDERED 
AND SET ASIDE. 
In the spring of 1980, the Dewsnups were in the process 
of purchasing the Arrow Land under the Purchase Contract and 
had given the plaintiffs a security interest in the Purchase 
Contract under the Assignment of Contract. On June 2, 1980, 
the Dewsnups terminated the Purchase Contract by failing to 
make the January 2, 1980 payment by June 2, 1980. The 
Purchase Contract provided that if any annual January 2 
payment was not made to the escrow agent by June 2 of that 
year, the Purchase Contract automatically terminated: 
If Buyers default on the payment falling due on 
January 2, 1977, or any payment thereafter 
falling due, and if such sum or any part thereof 
remains in default for a period of five months, 
then Buyers shall forfeit any and all right, title 
and interest that they otherwise would have in and 
to the property covered by this agreement, title 
to which has not passed to Buyers at that time, 
and this agreement shall terminate. 
(Purchase Contract, pp. 5-6). 
The escrow instructions instructed the escrow agent to deliver 
title to the Arrow Land back to the seller if it had not 
received the annual January 2 payment by June 2 of any year: 
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Your instructions are to...release to the seller the 
warranty deed...if...the Buyers shall default in the 
payment of any sum falling due under the agreement and 
said sum or any part thereof remains in default for a 
period of five months. 
(Escrow Instructions, Paragraph 4) 
Thus, when the Dewsnups did not make the January 2, 1980 
payment by June 2, 1980, the Purchase Contract automatically 
terminated, and title to the Arrow Land was automatically 
delivered back to the seller. 
The Assignment of Contract only required the Dewsnups to 
reimburse plaintiffs for payments made by plaintiffs "under 
and pursuant to [the Purchase Contract]:" 
[The Dewsnups] agree that in the event they are in 
default that [plaintiffs] may make the payments 
due under and pursuant to [the Purchase Contract] 
and will be reimbursed for the same by [the 
Dewsnups]. 
(Assignment of Contract, Paragraph 4). 
The plaintiffs' payment of $49,966.21 was made on June 7, 1980 
and therefore could not have been made "under or pursuant to 
the Purchase Contract" since the Purchased Contract had 
terminated five days before that payment was made. 
Consequently, the Dewsnups had no contractual obligation under 
the Assignment of Contract to reimburse plaintiffs for that 
payment. 
Even if the Dewsnups were required to reimburse the 
plaintiffs for that payment, that payment was not secured by 
the Trust Deed. The Trust Deed only secured the Promissory 
Notes and did not secure payments made under the Assignment of 
Contract: 
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[The] trustor conveys and warrants to trustee 
in trust with power of sale, the following 
described property...for the purpose of securing 
payment of the indebtedness evidence by a 
promissory note of even date herewith, in the 
principal sums of $33,000; 56,000 and 30,000, made 
by Trustor, payable to the order of Beneficiary at 
the times, in the manner and with interest as thereon 
set forth, and any extensions and/or renewals or 
modifications thereof. 
(Trust Deed, p. 1) 
Under Utah law, a trust deed cannot be foreclosed for a 
debt that is not secured by the trust deed. In First 
Security Bank of Utah v. Shiew, 609 P.2d 952 (Utah 1980) the 
Utah Supreme Court stated: 
[T]o attempt to foreclose, for example, on the 
mortgager's home for debts incurred in operating 
a business and which debts are not specifically 
covered by the mortgage would be unconscionable 
and contrary to public policy. 
Id. at 955-56 (citation omitted). 
Furthermore, in interpreting whether a trust deed secures a 
debt, the trust deed will be "construed most strictly against 
its framer." Bank of Ephraim v. Davis, 559 P.2d 538, 540 
(Utah 1977). In Shiew, for example, the Utah Supreme Court 
held that even though a mortgage purported to secure all 
future advances, a future advance was not secured by the 
mortgage where the intention that the future advance be 
secured by the mortgage was not specifically referenced in the 
document under which the future advance was made. 60 9 P.2d at 
957. 
In this case, neither the Trust Deed nor the Assignment 
of Contract even mention that advances made under the 
Assignment of Contract are to be secured by the Trust Deed. 
Even if there were some mention made, it would be strictly 
construed against the plaintiffs, who drafted the loan 
documents. If the court in Shiew holds that a mortgage does 
not secure future advances that the mortgage purports to 
secure because there is not sufficient intent manifest in the 
other documents, clearly the Trust Deed in this case does not 
secure advances made under the Assignment of Contract where 
none of the documents manifest that intention. The summary 
judgment erroneously foreclosed on the Trust Deed for a debt 
that was not valid, and even if valid, was not secured by the 
Trust Deed. Therefore, the summary judgment should either be 
set aside or certified as final so that it can be appealed. 
Everyone in this case knows that the summary judgment was 
wrongfully granted. In the proceedings below, the plaintiffs 
never even tried to justify the summary judgment, but only 
argued that procedurally the summary judgment should not be 
reconsidered. The Dewsnups have suffered for many years as a 
result of a summary judgment that was wrongfully granted. The 
time has come to set it aside. If it is not set aside, the 
summary judgment should be certified as final so that it can 
be appealed. 
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Ill 
THE DEWSNDPS1 MOTION TO AMEND THEIR COUNTERCLAIM 
SHOULD HAVE BEEN GRANTED. 
A. UNTIL JANUARY 6, 1991, THE DEWSNUPS1 WERE BARRED FROM 
PROCEEDING ON THEIR COUNTERCLAIM. 
At the time the Dewsnups filed bankruptcy, the Dewsnups1 
counterclaim became part of the "estate" created pursuant to 
Section 5 41(c) of the Bankruptcy Act (11 U.S.C.A. Section 101 
et seq.). Section 541(a)(1) of the Bankruptcy Act provides 
that the bankruptcy estate includes "all legal or equitable 
interests of the debtor in property as of the commencement of 
the case." Commentators have stated that "[i]t is...intended 
that all interests of the debtor in rights of action be 
included as property of the estate under Section 541(a)(1)." 
4 L. Kingr Collier on Bankruptcy, Section 541.10[1] (15th 
Ed. 1991) (Emphasis in original). 
Under Section 323(a) of the Bankruptcy Act, the 
bankruptcy trustee is the "representative of the estate," and 
is authorized to act on behalf of the bankruptcy estate. 
Bankruptcy Rule 6009 provides that "[w]ith or without court 
approval, the trustee...may prosecute...any pending action or 
proceeding by...the debtor." Under Section 554 of the 
Bankruptcy Act, the bankruptcy trustee is authorized to 
abandon property of the bankruptcy estate that is "burdensome 
to the estate or that is of inconsequential value and benefit 
to the estate." Upon abandonment, "the trustee is simply 
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divested of control of the property because it is no longer 
part of the estate." 4 L. King, Collier on Bankruptcy, 
Section 554.02[2] (15th Ed, 1991). Title to a right of action 
that has been abandoned "reverts to the debtor and he may then 
prosecute if he so desires." Id. Section 541.10[1]. 
Until the Dewsnups1 counterclaim was abandoned by the 
trustee, the Dewsnups could not prosecute the counterclaim. 
Had they attempted to prosecute the counterclaim, they would 
have experienced the same result as in Benson v. Probst, 366 
P.2d 700 (Utah 1961). In that case, a married couple that had 
filed bankruptcy attempted to prosecute a claim on their own 
behalf that had not been abandoned by the bankruptcy trustee. 
The Utah Supreme Court barred the couple from doing so, 
stating that the claim became "an asset in the hands of the 
trustee in bankruptcy" and the trustee had "plenary power to 
deal with it as an asset and as the trustee and the federal 
courts deem proper...." _Id. at 700. 
On January 6, 1991, the bankruptcy trustee abandoned the 
Dewsnups1 counterclaim. Until then, the Dewsnups were unable 
to pursue their counterclaim. After the Dewsnups1 
counterclaim has been abandoned, the Dewsnups sought to amend 
and pursue their counterclaim. The court, however, denied 
their motion to amend, holding that the counterclaim had been 
"implicitly" disposed of by the summary judgment. 
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B. THE DEWSNUPS1 MOTION TO AMEND THEIR COUNTERCLAIM 
SHOULD HAVE BEEN GRANTED. 
Rule 15(a) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure provides 
that a counterclaim may be amended "by leave of the court" and 
that "leave shall be freely given when justice so requires": 
A party may amend his pleading once as a matter of 
course at any time before a responsive pleading is 
served orf if the pleading is one to which no 
responsive pleading is permitted and the action has 
not been placed on the trial calendar, he may so 
amend if at any time within 20 days after it is 
served. Otherwise a party may amend his pleading 
only by leave of court or by written consent of 
the adverse party; and leave shall be freely given 
when justice so requires. 
The Utah Supreme Court has stated that Rule 15 should be 
interpreted liberally so as to allow parties to have their 
claims fully adjudicated: 
[The Rules of Civil Procedure] must all be looked 
to in the light of their even more fundamental 
purpose of liberalizing both pleading and 
procedure to the end that the parties are afforded 
the privilege of presenting whatever legitimate 
contentions they have pertaining to their dispute. 
Cheney v. Rucker, 381 P.2d 86, 91 (Utah 1963). 
"[T]he policy of the law is toward liberality in the allowance 
of amendments and to regard them favorably in order that the 
real controversy between the parties may be presented, their 
rights determined, and the cause decided..." Johnson v. 
Brinkerhoff, 57 P.2d 1132, 1136 (Utah 1936) (Citation 
omitted). The "courts should be liberal in allowing 
amendments to the end that cases may be fully and fairly 
presented on their merits." Hancock v. Lukey 148 P. 452, 
457 (Utah 1915) (Citation omitted). 
Accordingly, the Utah Supreme Court has long held that if 
the opposing party has an adequate opportunity to respond to 
the amended pleadings, the amendment should be allowed. In 
overruling the trial court's denial of a Rule 15 motion to 
amend in Lewis v. Moultree, 627 P.2d 94 (Utah 1981), the 
Utah Supreme Court stated that leave to amend should have been 
granted since the opposing party had "fair opportunity" to 
respond to the amended pleading: 
A prime consideration in determining whether an 
amendment should be permitted is the adequacy of 
an opportunity for the opposing party to meet the 
newly raised matter.... Some tempest has been raised 
about the court allowing the plaintiff to make 
tardy amendments to the pleadings.... The pleadings 
are never more important than the case that is before 
the court.... There can be no prejudice in this case 
because we'll give ample time for an answer.... This 
is in harmony with what we regard as the correct 
policy: of recognizing the desirability of the 
pleadings setting forth definitely frame issues, but 
also of permitting amendment where the interest of 
justice so requires, and the adverse party is given 
a fair opportunity to meet it. 
Id. at 98 (Citations omitted). 
Similarly, in upholding a trial court's granting of leave to 
amend in Cheney v. Rucker, 381 P.2d 86 (Utah 1963), the Utah 
Supreme Court held that "[w]hat [the opposing party is] 
entitled to is notice of the issues raised and an opportunity 
to meet them. When this is accomplished, that is all that is 
required." _Id. at 91. 
The Utah Supreme Court has never upheld a trial court's 
refusal to grant leave to amend a pleading before a trial date 
has been set, since at that point in the litigation the 
opposing party will always have time to respond to the amended 
pleading. (See Gillman v. Hansen, 486 P.2d 1045 (Utah 1971) 
(where the case had not been set for trial, the trial court 
"abused its discretion" in refusing to permit defendant to 
amend its answer to add a counterclaim); Detroit Vapor Stove 
Co. v. J. C. Weeter Lumber Co., 215 P. 995 (Utah 1923) 
(where the case had not been set for trial, it was "error" for 
the trial court to refuse to permit an amendment to the 
counterclaim); Hancock v. Luke, 148 P. 452 (Utah 1915) 
(where case had not been set for trial, it was "error" for the 
trial court to refuse to permit an amendment to the answer). 
The Utah Supreme Court has stated that "the rule in this 
state has always been to allow amendments freely where justice 
requires, and especially is this true before trial." Gillman 
v. Hansen. 486 P.2d 1045, 1046 (Utah 1971). In Gillman, 
the court went on to state that one of the purposes of a 
pre-trial conference was to "enable the parties to make such 
amendments to the pleadings as may be required to present all 
issues at trial." JEd. at 1047. 
In this case, no trial date has been set and no pretrial 
conference has been held with respect to the counterclaim. 
The opposing party will have ample opportunity to respond to 
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the Dewsnups' Amended Counterclaim. Under these 
circumstances, the Utah Supreme Court has always held that 
leave to amend must be granted. 
The only time the Utah Supreme Court has upheld a trial 
court's refusal to grant leave to amend is where the amendment 
was sought shortly before trial or at trial so that the 
opposing party did not have adequate time to respond. See 
Hein's Turkey Hatcheries, Inc. v. Nephi Processing Plant, 
Inc., 470 P.2d 257 (Utah 1970) (upholding trial court's 
denial of motion to amend answer at trial); Girard v. 
Appleby, 660 P.2d 245 (Utah 1983) (upholding trial court's 
denial of motion to amend complaint at trial because of the 
"disadvantage" defendants would face trial); Staker v. 
Huntington Cleveland Irrigation Co., 664 P.2d 1188, 1190-91 
(Utah 1983) (upholding trial courts denial of motion to amend 
answer at trial because amendment would make "the expense of 
discovery and preparing for trial" by opposing party "wasteful 
and pointless"; Westley v. Farmer's Insurance Exchange, 663 
P.2d 93 (Utah 1983) (upholding trial court's denial of motion 
to amend complaint brought several weeks before trial which 
would have caused the trial to be postponed); Kelly v. Utah 
Power & Light, 746 P.2d 1189 (Utah App. 1987) (upholding 
trial courts denial of motion to amend shortly before trial 
because opposing party would have been prejudiced by having an 
issue adjudicated for which they did not have time to 
prepare). In this case, the plaintiffs will have ample time 
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to respond to the amended counterclaim. No trial date has 
been set. No pretrial conference has been held. The 
Dewsnups1 Motion to Amend Counterclaim should have been 
granted. 
CONCLUSION 
In 1980, a meritless claim was brought against the 
Dewsnups by their own attorney. Although the claim was 
meritless, a court granted summary judgment on that claim when 
the attorney that their attorney had recommended represent 
them failed to make an appearance on the plaintiffs1 motion 
for summary judgment (unbeknownest to the Dewsnups for many 
years). 
The summary judgment having been granted, the Dewsnups 
have spent 10 years in bankruptcy court litigation trying to 
save the family farm. The Dewsnups perservered, knowing they 
were in the right and believing that someday, somehow, if they 
did not give up justice would prevail. 
The summary judgment was wrongfully granted. Everyone in 
this case knows that. However, the Dewsnups1 former attorney 
(and the other plaintiffs) have pursued the Dewsnups through 
10 years of bankruptcy litigation trying to enforce it. The 
Dewsnups are entitled to justice just like any other citizen, 
and the Dewsnups are entitled to be released from the bondage 
of this injustice. 
The Dewsnups1 counterclaim has never been decided and has 
finally been released to them by the bankruptcy trustee. The 
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Dewsnups are entitled to finally have their day in court on 
their amended counterclaim, as well as to have the summary 
judgment finally set aside. 
Based on the foregoing, this court should hold that the 
Dewsnups1 counterclaim was not "implicitly" disposed of and 
should set aside the summary judgment and grant the Dewsnups 
leave to amend their counterclaim. 
DATED this j?<[day of July, 1991. 
RUSS 
t+MA C^~~~ 
J ELL A. CLINE 
Attorney for T. LaMar 
and Aletha Dewsnup 
MAILING CERTIFICATE 
This is to certify that on this gtS-day of July, 1991, 
four (4) true and correct copies of the foregoing Appellants 
Brief were hand delivered to: 
Michael Z. Hayes 
Mazuran, Verhaaren & Hayes 
2180 South 1300 East, Suite 260 
Salt take City, Utah 84106 
(Vs***^ ^ t , 
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DEMAND FOR REIMBURSEMENT (Assignment of Contract) 
TO: T. LaMAR and ALETHA DEWSNUP, 
Deseret, Utah 84625 
You have failed to make the annual payment due under 
the terms of the assigned Uniform Real Estate Contract. You 
have also failed to pay the 1979 Property Taxes when due. 
Therefore: 
Assignees, under the terms of the Assignment of Contract 
dated June 1, 1978, by and between T. LaMar Dewsnup and Aletha 
Dewsnup, Assignors, and Trustees of United Precision Machine 
and Engineering Company Profit Sharing Plan, ABCO Insurance 
Agency, Inc. and Joseph L. Henriod, Trustee for the Annette 
Jacob Trust, Assignees, hereby demand that Assignors reimburse 
Assignees the amount of Forty-Nine Thousand Nine-Hundred Sixty-
Six Dollars and twenty-one cents ($49,966.21) which sum has 
been paid by Assignees as follows: $47,880.50 paid on June 7, 
1980, to Valley Bank at Delta, Utah as escrow agent under the 
terms of the above-described Contract, and $2,085.71 paid on 
June 7, 1980, to the Millard County Treasurer for past due taxes. 
Assignees demand that Assignors continue to perform all 
of the conditions and obligations requested under the terms 
of the Real Estate Contract. 
If you fail to comply with this Demand within five (5) 
days, legal action will be filed against you for damages, in-
terest and attorney's fees in accordance with the terms of said 
Assignment of Contract. 
Govern yourself accordingly. 
DATED this /6/t£ day of June, 1980. 
ASSIGNESS: 
STATE OF UTAH ) 
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE ) 
On this day o 
appeared before me 
Trustee, United~T?recision Machine 
& Engineering Company Profit 
Sharing., 'psust 
Ttoris'fcee, United Precision Machine 
j( Engineering Company Profit 
/Sharing Trust 
6ML 
Trus£ee, UntLted Precision Machine 
& Engineering Company Profit 
Sharing Trust 
A Krehl Smithr President' 
ABCO Insurance Agencyf Inc. 
gpseph L. lienriod, Trustee for 
Annette Jacob Trust 
tj^y , 1980, personally 
/^Lwunt) / who being 
^ 
by me duly sworn, says that he is the Trustee of United Precision 
Machine & Engineering Company Profit Sharing Trust, the Trust that 
executed the above and foregoing instrument and that said instrument 
was signed in behalf of said Trust by authority of its Trust 
Agreement and said C%J~LLi*iJ ,^y /'AATUryU acknowledged 
to me that said Trust executed the same. 
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In witness whereof I have herewith set my hand and affixed 
my seal this /&%. day of y ^ ^ , 1980. 
,/Wy^ 
Notar/ Public v ^ y 
Residing at JW^/yWf. 
My Commission Expires: 
^ 
STATE OF UTAH ) 
ss. 
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE ) 
011
 this /^{T dav of ^UILMJLJ , 1980, personally 
appeared before me ^AjL) /LJIUU^ULJL , who being 
by me duly sworn, says that he is the Trustee of United Precision 
Machine & Engineering Company Profit Sharing Trust, the Trust that 
executed the above and foregoing instrument and that said instrument 
was signed in behalf of said Trust by authority of its Trust 
Agreement and said S^fe^J /luM^o-^iLj acknowledged 
to me that said Trust executed the same. 
In witness whereof I have herewith set my had and affixed 
my seal this /C^tX. day of ^l~t*»-*-- , 1980. 
Notary/Public 
^ ^ 3 ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ 
Residing at >^4<£*'2^4*. ^fJ^^' 
My Commission Expires: 
17^ <, <• 
STATE OF UTAH ) 
ss. 
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE ) 
On this z&^C day of V ^ ^ { J , 1980, personally 
appeared before me , who being 
by me duly sworn, says that he is the Trustee of United Precision 
Machine & Engineering Company Profit Sharing Trust, the Trust that 
executed the above and foregoing instrument and that said instrument 
was signed in behalf of said Trust by authority of its Trust 
Agreement and said ^^CCL^CL ^ WlUjL^J , acknowledged 
to me that said Trust executed the same. 
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In witness whareof I have herewith se t r?.y hanJl and *ffi.:ad 
my seal t h i s /Qft day of / ^ ^ . 198 0. 
4y jrfw2*/o 
ary Public y Notary Public • Residing at >&d4Zr ££&*£, 
My Commission Expires: 
STATE OF UTAH ) 
ss. 
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE ) 
On this / U> day of i^c^^c , 1980, personally 
appeared before me A. KreUr Smith, who being by me duly sworn, 
says that he is the President of ABCO Insurance Agency, Inc., the 
corporation that executed the above and foregoing instrument and 
that said instrument was signed in behalf of said corporation by 
authority of its by-laws and said A. Krehl Smith acknowledged to 
me that said corporation executed the same. 
In witness whereof I have herewith set my hand and affixed 
my seal this /Q? day of (J^zt^^ t 1980. 
Notary Publ 
Residing at %A 2*£j*r%~ 
My Commission Expires: 
STATE OF UTAH 
ss. 
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE ) 
On this /yO day of '/J-JUL) 1980, personally 
appeared before me Joseph/L/ Henriod, who being by me duly sworn, 
says that he is the Trustee of Annette Jacob Trust, the Trust that 
executed the above and foregoing instrument and that said instrument 
was signed in behalf of said Trust by authority of its Trust 
Agreement and said Joseph L. Henriod acknowledged to me that said 
Trust executed the same. 
In witness whereof I have herewith set my hand and affixed 
my seal this /(& daY o f JLC^tXJ , 1980. 
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Nbtary 
Residing 
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WENDELL E. BENNETT 
AND ASSOCIATES 
Attorneys at Law 
Attornies for Plaintiffs 
370 East 500 South, Suite 100 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone: 532-7846 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF MILLARD COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
oooOooo 
LOUIS L. TIMM, JOHN NEIUWLAND, 
and FLOYD M. CHILDS, Trustees 
of United Precision Machine 
and Engineering Company Profit 
Sharing Trust; ABCO Insurance 
Agency, Inc., a Utah Corpora-
tion; and, JOSEPH L. HENROID, 
Trustee for the ANNETTE JACOB 
TRUST, 
Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
T. LAMAR DEWSNUP and ALETHA 
DEWSNUP, ARROW INVESTMENT CO. 
a Limited partnership, THE 
FEDERAL LAND BANK OF BERKLEY, 
IMPERIAL LAND TITLE INC. , as 
Trustee and EUGENE L. CARSON and 
ELAINE CARSON as Beneficiaries, 
STRINGHAM, MAZURAN, LARSEN & 
SABIN, a Professional Corpora-
tion, MINERAL FERTILIZER CO., 
INC, and HARRY V. KAPS. 
Defendants. 
oooOooo 
COMES NOW the plaintiffs above named, and complains of 
the defendants, and for cause of action alleges: 
1. That on June 1, 1978, the plaintiff United Precision 
Machine and Engineering Company Profit Sharing Trust lent to the 
defendants the sum of $30,000.00; the plaintiff ABCO Insurance 
Agency, Inc. lent to the defendants the sum of $56,000.00; and 
Joseph L. Henroid, Trustee of the Annette Jacob Trust lent to the 
defendants the sum of $33,000.00, all amounts bearing interest 
from that date until paid at the rate of 18% per annum. Copies of 
said promissory notes are attached hereto, and by this reference 
made a part hereof. 
&&L4)TFiK\:*<:V*'A ™ THE 
Disraici court;1 
StH 16 1380 | p 
r\ J • — c , e r k 
^ U M F L i A l N T 
C i v i l No. 111/ 
^ n r\
 r > , 
•> J , J' 
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2. Under the terms of the promissory notes herein before 
referred to all accrued interest was to have been paid on June 1, 
1979? and the entire balance of interest and principal was to have 
been paid on or before June 1, 1980. 
3. The principal sum of $119,000.00 has not been paid, 
and interest due on June 1, 1980 in the sum of $21,420.00 has not 
been paid, and the entire amount thereof is now due and payable, 
plus daily interest on the principal amount at the rate of $58.68 
per day. 
4. That in order for the plaintiffs to protect their 
security hereinafter referred to it was necessary for them to pay 
$47,880.50 to Valley Bank in order to protect the security herein 
sued upon, and to also pay to the Millard County Treasurer the sum 
of $1,042.85 in order to protect the security herein sued upon due 
to the defendants' failure and refusal to make those payments when 
due. The daily interest on the $47,880.50 that the defendants owe 
to the plaintiffs is $23.61 per day from the date the payment was 
made until the plaintiffs are reimbursed therefore, and the daily 
interest on the $1,042.85 paid to the Millard County Treasurer is 
$.51 per day from the date of payment until the plaintiffs are 
repaid by the defendants. 
5. That the obligation herein sued upon was secured by 
a trust deed which is in default, and will be going to trust deed 
sale following the expiration of time required by statute under 
the trust deed default provisions, with the notice of sale to be 
set on or after September 26, 1980. The properties subject to 
trust deed sale are located in Millard County, State of Utah, are 
more particularly described as follows, to wit: 
BEGINNING 980 Feet West of the Southeast Corner of the 
Southwest 1/4 of Section 4, Township 17 South, Range 4 
West, Salt Lake Base & Meridian; thence North 1320 feet; 
thence West 1264 feet; thence South 625 feet; thence 
Southeasterly along the roadway 541 feet; thence South 
470 feet; thence East 840 feet to beginning. More or 
less 35 Acres. 
BEGINNING 980 feet West of the Northeast Corner of the 
Northwest 1/4 of Section 9, Township 17 South, Range 4 
West, Salt Lake Base & Meridian; thence South 1320 feet; 
thence West 840 feet; thence North 1320 feet; thence 
East 840 feet to beginning. More or less 25 Acres. 
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The Southwest quarter of the Northeast quarter; of the 
Northwest quarter of the Southeast quarter; the South-
east quarter of the Northwest quarter; and the Northeast 
quarter of the Southwest quarter of Section 13, Township 
18 South, Range 8 West, Salt Lake Base & Meridian, 
EXCEPTING THEREFROM that portion which lies within the 
boundaries Of the DELTA CANAL COMPANY, MELVILLE IRRIGA-
TION COMPANY, ABRAHAM IRRIGATION COMPANY and the DESERET 
IRRIGATION COMPANY distribution systems. 
EXCEPTING THEREFROM all rights of way, stock trails, 
ditches and canals, gravel pits and gravel beds. 
Together with all water rights appurtenant to said 
property. 
6. That in addition to the trust deed securing said 
loan, the defendants executed an assignment of contract wherein 
they assigned their contract of purchase dated November 1, 1976 
with Arrow Investment, Ltd. to the plaintiffs, and also gave a 
security agreement to the plaintiffs dated June 1, 1978. The 
assignment of contract, marked Exhibit A is attached hereto, and 
by this reference is made a part hereof the same as if the entire 
assignment of contract and its attachments were set out verbatim 
at this point. The security agreement, marked Exhibit B is 
attached hereto, and by this reference made a part hereof as if 
the same had been set out verbatim at this point in the complaint. 
7. The properties subject to the assignment of contract 
dated November 1, 1976 are located in Millard County, State of 
Utah, and are more particularly described as follows, to wit: 
Parcel No. 1: That certain farm commonly known as the 
Curtis Farm, consisting of 177 acres, more or less, and 
described as the SW 1/4 of Section 8, T. 18 S., R. 7 W., 
SLB&M; and beg. at the NW corner of the SE 1/4 of said 
Section 8, thence S. 610 feet, then E. 1218 feet, thence 
N. 610 feet, and thence W. 1218 feet to the point of 
beginning. 
Parcel No. 2; That certain farm commonly known as the 
Greenwood Farm, consisting of 89.93 acres, more or less, 
and described as beginning at the NW corner of Section 
18, T. 18 S., R. 7W,, SLB&M, thence E. 2010.5 feet, 
thence S. 150.8 feet, thence S. 75° 51'W. 332 feet, 
thence S. 30° 59' W. 601 feet, thence southerly to a 
point N. 42° 28'E. 133.9 feet from the SE corner of the 
SW 1/4 of the NW 1/4, thence S. 42° 28' W. 133.9 feet, 
thence westerly to the W. 1/4 corner of said Section 18, 
thence northerly to the NW corner of said Section, the 
place of beginning. 
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Parcel No. 3: That certain farm commonly known as the 
John Baker Farm, consisting of 157.25 acres, more or 
less, and described as the E. 1/2 of the N.E. 1/4 and 
the E. 1/2 of the S.E. 1/4 of Section 13, T. 18 S., R. 8 
W., SLB&M, less a strip 5 1/2 rods wide on the S. side 
of the SE 1/4 of the SE 1/4 of said Section 13. 
Parcel No. 4: A part of that certain tract known as the 
Tamarack Forty, consisting of approximately 25 acres, 
more or less, and described as beginning at the SW 
corner of the SE 1/4 of the SE 1/4 of Section 12, T. 18 
S., R. 8 W., SLB&M, thence East to the middle or thread 
of the Baker Ditch, thence northerly along the middle or 
thread of said ditch to the intersection of said ditch 
with the Conk Ditch, thence due North to the existing 
fence located between said Conk Ditch and the White Top 
Ditch, thence easterly along said fence to the Conk 
Ditch, thence northeasterly along the middle or thread 
of said Conk Ditch to the intersection with the North 
Boundary of said SE 1/4 of the SE 1/4 of said Section 
12, thence due West to the West boundary of said SE 1/4 
of the SE 1/4 of said Section 12, thence due South to 
the point of beginning. In general terms, this tract is 
the westerly 25 acres, more or less, of said SE 1/4 of 
the SE 1/4 of said section 12. 
Parcel'No. 5; A part of that certain tract known as the 
White Top Forty, consisting of approximately 30 acres, 
more or less, and described as beginning at the SW 
corner of the NE 1/4 of the SE 1/4 of Section 12, T. 18 
S., R. 8 W., SLB&M, thence due East to the intersection 
with the Conk Ditch, thence northerly along the middle 
or thread of said ditch to the North boundary of said NE 
1/4 of the SE 1/4 of said Section 12, thence due West to 
the West boundary of said NE 1/4 of the SE 1/4 of said 
Section 12, thence due South to the point of beginning. 
In general terms, this tract is the westerly 30 acres, 
more or less, of said NE 1/4 of the SE 1/4 of said 
Section 12. 
Parcel No. 6: That certain farm commonly known as the 
Oley Black Farm, containing 78 acres, more or less, and 
described as the E. 1/2 of the N.W. 1/4 of Section 12, 
T. 18 S., R. 8 W., SLB&M, less a strip two rods in width 
on the E. side of said tract. 
8. That the collateral subject to the security agree-
ment referred to in the foregoing paragraphs consist of the 
following: A water right of 4 days use per month during the grow-
ing season of the Conk Ditch Irrigation Association consisting of 
6.66 acre feet per hour between 5:00 a.m. of the 25th and 5:00 
a.m. of the 29th of each month and all proceeds of sale for the 
disposition thereof. 
9. That the defendant Arrow Investment Company, a 
limited partnership, claims a right, title, and interest in and to 
the property described in paragraph 7, as contract sellers under 
an agreement for the sale of real and personal property dated 
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November 1, 1976, which is the contract that the defendants 
Dewsnup assigned to the plaintiffs, and as the contract seller 
under said contract their right, title, and interest in and to the 
real property described in paragraph 7 will be effected, and 
their rights in this matter must, therefore, be adjudicated. 
10. That the defendants Imperial Land Title, Inc., as 
trustee, in favor of Eugene L. Carson and Elaine Carson as benefi-
ciaries, and Eugene L. Carson and Elaine Carson individually as 
beneficiaries under a trust deed recorded June 12, 1979, as entry 
number 28429 in book 134 at page 330-332 of the official records 
of the Millard County Recorder's Office are necessary parties to 
this action in that they claim a right, title, and interest to the 
real property described in paragraph 7, and the court will need to 
adjudicate their right, title, and interest in and to the real 
property described in paragraph 7 of this complaint, which 
interest is inferior and subordinate to the interest of the 
plaintiffs, and which should, therefore, be extinguished. 
11. That the defendants Strmgham, Mazuran, Larsen, and 
Sabin, a professional corporation has filed a notice of lien for 
attorney's fees and legal services against the property described 
in paragraph 7, recorded February 25, 1980 as entry number 31183 
in book 139 at page 638 of the offical records of the Millard 
County Recorder's Office, which lien must be adjudicated and ruled 
inferior and subordinate to the interest of the plaintiff in this 
action. 
12. That the defendant Mineral Fertilizer Company, Inc. , 
a corporation has filed a judgment obtained in the District Court 
of the Third Judicial District in and for the county of Salt Lake 
against LaMar Dewsnup in the sum of $8,667.22, plus attorney's 
fees, interests and costs, which was filed on August 15, 1978 in 
the County Clerk's Office of Millard County, case number 6917, 
which judgment lien is inferior and subordinate to the interests 
of the plaintiff, and which should be adjudicated as being 
inferior and subordinate to the plaintiff's interests herein. 
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13. That the defendant Harry V. Kaps, claims a lien 
against the property described in paragraph 7 by reason of a 
judgment obtained against LaMar Dewsnup in the District Court of 
the Sixth Judicial District in and for the County of Garfield, for 
the sum of $12,795,55, plus attorney's fees, interests and costs 
that was filed on May 16, 1980 in the County Clerk's Office of 
Millard County, case number 7141, which interest of said defendant 
Kaps is subordinate and inferior to the interest of the plaintiffs 
herein, which interest needs to be adjudicated in this proceeding. 
14. That the defendant, the Federal Land Bank of 
Berkley is a necessary party to this action in fact it claims a 
right, title, and interest to the real property described in 
paragraph 7 by virtue of a mortgage dated December 4, 1974, execu-
ted by Richard L. Dewsnup and Barbara W. Dewsnup, his wife, to 
secure payment of a note bearing even date thereof in the sum of 
$85,000.00 with interest thereon, payable as therein provided, 
which was recorded December 19, 1974 as entry number 12241 in book 
108 at page 36 of the official records of the Millard County 
Recorder's Office, which interest needs to be adjudicated by the 
court. 
15. That it will be necessary for the court to adjudi-
cate the respective rights of the plaintiffs and the defendants to 
the property claimed by the plaintiffs and the defendants by 
reason of contracts, assignments of contracts, trust deeds, 
judgment liens, and the like, to order said property sold by 
sheriff sale pursuant to Utah law, and to then distribute the 
proceeds obtained on the sale to the parties both plaintiff and 
defendant claiming any right, title, or interest in and to the 
real property described in paragraph 7, and to determine the 
respective priorities claimed by all parties to the proceeds, and 
determine their standing following the sale of the property 
covered under that assigned contract by and between Arrow Invest-
ment Company, a limited partnership as seller and Thomas LaMar 
Dewsnup and AlLee Aletha J. Dewsnup as buyers, which contract was 
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dated November 1, 1976, and also to that property described in the 
security agreement by and between the Dewsnups and the plaintiffs 
herein which is dated the 1st day of June, 1978. 
That following the sale of the property covered under 
the assignment of contract and the security agreement herein 
before referred to the amount due and owing the plaintiffs by the 
defendants Dewsnup must be determined, and a judgment against them 
entered for any unpaid amounts owing to the plaintiffs from the 
defendants Dewsnup following the sale of the security herein 
referred to, and also the trust deed sale referred to in paragraph 
5 of the complaint. 
WHEREFORE, plaintiff prays judgment against all defend-
ants determining the respective priority to the property in question 
that was given by the defendants Dewsnup to the plaintiffs as 
security for the loan of $119,000.00 principal, plus interest, 
ordering said property sold, and the proceeds distributed in 
accordance with the priorities of the respected parties, determin-
ing any deficiency then remaining after both the sheriff's sale 
and the trust deed sale, fixing and awarding to the plaintiffs 
herein all of their costs of court, legal expenses and attorney's 
fees actually incurred, and the entry of a deficiency judgment 
against the defendants Dewsnup for any monies left unpaid on their 
obligation to the plaintiffs following the disposition of the 
security in question in this litigation, and the trust deed sale 
referred to in paragraph 5 of this complaint, with interest on all 
amounts, and for such other and further relief in accordance with 
the agreements and the contracts by and between the parties as 
would be just and equitable in the premises, and for all other 
relief provided for by law. 
DATED this day of September, 1980. 
WENDELL E. BENNETT & ASSOCIATES 
L^f/^LA P l a i n t i f f ' s A d d r e s s : BY 
^ATTORNIES FOR PLAINTIFFS 
S a l t Lake C i t y , Utah 370 Eas t 500 S o u t h , S u i t e 100 
S a l t Lake C i t y , Utah 84111 
£xw*irr c COlilNT\ CLEKK * EX-OFFICJO CLERK OF THE 
DISTRICT COURT 
MAR - 3 1981 
WENDELL E. BENNETT 
AND ASSOCIATES 
Attorneys at Law 
Attorneys for Plaintiffs 
370 East 500 South, Suite 100 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone: 532-7846 
MILLARD COUNTY 
— Clerk 
m&d^L&lUJh**' Deputy £ 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT FOR MILLARD COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
oooOooo 
LOUIS L. TIMM, et al. : MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
Plaintiffs 
vs. 
T. LAMAR DEWSNUP, et al. 
'Defendants. : Civil No. 7191 
oooOooo 
COMES NCW the plaintiffs above named, and moves the 
court, pursuant to Rule 56, Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, for a 
summary judgment against the defendants Dewsnup for the principal 
sum of $49,966.21, with interest thereon at either the rate of 10% 
or 18%, as the court may determine is due as a matter of law from 
June 2, 1980 until paid, and for attorney's fees in an amount in 
excess of $5,000.00, which will be testified to by legal counsel 
for the plaintiffs at the time of the hearing on the motion for 
summary judgment, and for the plaintiffs' costs of court herein 
incurred. 
This motion is made on the grounds and for the reason 
that there are not material issues of fact remaining in this case, 
and as a matter of law the defendants Dewsnup are indebted to the 
plaintiffs in the sum of $49,966.21 in principal, plus interest, 
attorney's fees, and court costs, as a result of their breach of 
contract on promissory notes, securred by real property and water 
rights. Since the commencement of this action, the defendants 
Dewsnup have paid $147,652.36 in what was believed to be the first 
part of a two part settlement, however, they have not paid the 
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remaining $49,966.21 principal, or the interest and attorney's 
fees. The files and records of the court will indicate that the 
defendants are in default, and that the amount set out in the 
affidavit of Louis L. Timm, attached hereto, and by this reference 
made a part hereof, reflect that the defendants have a remaining 
balance due and owing the plaintiffs as above set out, and there 
are no material issues of fact that dispute that, and the plain-
tiffs are, therefore, entitled to summary judgment against the 
defendants, and each of them in the principal sum of $49,966.21, 
plus interest thereon from June 2, 1980 until paid, attorney's 
fees incurred, court costs incurred, and for such other and 
further relief as the court finds dtfe and owing. 
DATED this V ^ ^ a y of / / //^ '^(\ ' ^ , 1981. 
WENDELL E. BENNETT & ASSOCIATES 
WENDELL E. BENNETT 
Attorney for Plaintiffs 
MAILING CERTIFICATE 
I do hereby certify that I mailed a copy of the fore-
going on the\Jrio(day of / / \CL J ^ V V^/, 1981 to Robert C. 
Fillerup, 1325 South 800 East^Suite 305, Orem, Utah 84057. 3 U X 
"I 
' {? U; 6 
/ 
/ i C^~ t 
0000'J* 
£xCt»:+ 0 
WENDELL E. BENNETT 
AND ASSOCIATES 
Attorneys at Law 
Attorneys for Plaintiffs 
370 East 500 South, Suite 100 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone: 532-7846 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT FOR MILLARD COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
oooOooo 
LOUIS L. TIMM, et al. : AFFIDAVIT OF LOUIS L. TIMM 
Plaintiffs : 
vs. : 
T. LAMAR DEWSNUP, et al. : 
Defendants. : Civil No. 7191 
oooOooo 
STATE OF UTAH ) 
)ss 
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE ) 
LOUIS L. TIMM, being first duly sworn deposes and 
states: 
1. That he is one of the plaintiffs in the above entit-
led matter, and has personal knowledge as to all of the matters 
relative to the pending action, and matters stated in this affi-
davit. 
2. That on June 1, 1978, the plaintiff United Precision 
Machine & Engineering Company Profit Sharing Trust lent to the 
defendants T. LaMar Dewsnup and Aletha Dewsnup, the sum of 
$30,000.00; the plaintiff ABCO Insurance Agency, Inc. lent to the 
defendants T. LaMar Dewsnup and Aletha Dewsnup the sum of 
$56,000.00; and the Annette Jacob Trust lent to the defendants T. 
LaMar Dewsnup and Aletha Dewsnup the sum of $33,000.00, all 
amounts bearinq interest from that date until paid at the rate of 
18% per annum. Copies of said promissory notes were attached to 
the plaintiffs' complaint and are on file with the court. 
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3. Under the terms of the promissory notes herein 
referred tor all accrued interest was to have been paid on June 1, 
1979; and the entire balance of interest and principal was to have 
been paid on or before June lf 1980. 
4. Up to the time of the filing of the complaint in 
this action, the principal sum of $119,000.00 had not been paid, 
and interest due on June 1, 1980 had not been paid, and the action 
was commenced to collect on said obligation owed by the defendants 
Dewsnup. 
5. That in order for the plaintiffs to protect their 
security interest located in Millard County, State of Utah, which 
are described in paragraph 7 of the plaintiffs' complaint, it was 
necessary for them to pay $47,880.50 to Valley Bank in order to 
protect the* security that is the subject matter of this litiga-
tion, and to also pay to the Millard County Treasurer the sum of 
$2,085.71 (the sum of $1,042.85 set out in the complaint was an 
error, and only constituted approximately 1/2 of the payment made) 
in order to protect the security that is the subject matter of 
this litigation inasmuch as the defendants Dewsnup had failed and 
refused to make payments under the contract that had been assigned 
as security in this matter when they were due. Had that payment 
not been made and those taxes paid, the security would have been 
totally lost or substantially impaired inasmuch as the contract 
seller, a relative of the defendants Dewsnup, could have taken 
action to either substantially impair or destroy the security 
interest of the plaintiffs herein, by reclaiming the property from 
the defendants Dewsnup. The daily interest on the $47,880.50 that 
the defendants owe to the plaintiffs is $23.61 per day from the 
date the payment was made until the plaintiffs are reimbursed 
therefore, and the daily interest on the $2,085.71 paid to the 
Millard County Treasurer is $ilfl* per day from the date of payment 
until the plaintiffs are repaid by the defendants. 
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6. That since the commencement of the action, which was 
filed simultaneously with a trust deed default procedure, the 
defendants Dewsnup have paid, for the purpose of delaying a trust 
deed sale on the real property set out in paragraph 5 of the 
plaintiffs1 complaint, the sum of $147,652.36. The defendants 
Dewsnup have, however, failed and refused to pay the remainder 
owing to the plaintiffs, namely, the principal sums of $47,880.50 
that was paid to Valley Bank in Delta, Utah on the assignment of 
contract for the Richard Dewsnup/Arrow Investment Property, which 
sum was paid on June 2, 1980, and the $2,085.71 for back taxes 
paid to the Millard County Treasurer on June 7, 1980. The total 
principal sum of $49,966.21 is, therefore, due and payable to the 
plaintiffs by the defendants Dewsnup, plus interest. 
*7. The court's determination will have to be made as to 
whether or not the principal sum of $49,966.21 should draw inter-
est at the rate of 18% provided in the note, or 10%, which the 
note provides after default, there having been a typographical 
error made in the instruments that reduced the note interest from 
18% to 10% after default. 
8. Due to the defendant Dewsnup*s default in this 
matter, it has been necessary for the plaintiffs to retain legal 
counsel for the purpose of having the matter pursued on a legal 
basis, and legal expenses have already exceeded the sum of 
$5,000.00, and are still accruing, and can be testifed to by our 
attornies, Wendell E. Bennett & Associates at the time of the 
hearing on the motion for summary judgment for which this affida-
vit is given in support of. 
FURTHER AFFIANT SAITH NOT. ^  
DATED this S / day of ^ £iu( ^ \^ 1981. 
/ , 
sM.. 1 /"' <_ •« VV- 1 1 ^-
LOUIS L. TIMM 
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SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to be fore me t h i s ^ / V d a y o f \ Z c t ^ \ a ^ w U L 9 8 1 . l  
My Commission Expires NdTARY PUBLIC Res id ina At // 
MAILING CERTIFICATE " 
I do hereby cerbify—that I mailed a copy of the fore -
going on the C^4k?(day of / / / [fiflPlK^j 1981 to Robert C. 
F i l l erup, 1325 South 800 | a s t , Suite 305, Orem, Utah 8405^7. 
7 Wic " tf^/LV,//.-^ 
V 
v r f » U U ' . L t K K U t IHfc 
>s* Lf fe ! f" S DISTRICT COURT 
NOV 2 1 1980 
MILLARD COUNTY 
ROBERT C. FILLERUP V LM d^^—^* 
Attorney for Defendants I 
Oewsnups 
1325 South 800 East, Suite 305 
Orem, UT 84057 
226-0992 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT 
FOR MILLARD COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
—oooOooo— 
LOUIS L. TIMM, et al. ; 
Plaintiffs, : ANSWER AND COUNTERCLAIM 
-vs- : 
T. LAMAR DEWSNUP, et al. : Civil No. 
Defendants. : 
—oooOooo-
The defendants T. LAMAR DEWSNUP and ALETHA DEWSNUP 
answer the complaint of the plaintiff as follows: 
FIRST DEFENSE 
1. Plaintiffs' complaint fails to state a claim 
upon which relief can be granted. 
SECOND DEFENSE 
2. Defendants admit paragraphs 1 and 2 of plaintiffs' 
complaint. 
3. In answering paragraph 3 of plaintiffs' complaint, 
defendants admit that the sum of One Hundred Nineteen Thousand 
Dollars ($119,000) has not been paid, and admit that interest 
to June 1, 1980, has not been paid, but allege that defendants 
tendered the amount of Twenty-One Thousand Four Hundred 
Twenty Dollars ($31,420) to plaintiffs on June 1, 1980, which 
plaintiffs refused to accept. Further, defendants deny that 
interest accrues on the principal amount at the 
rate of Fifty-Eight Dollars and Sixty-Eight Cents ($58.68) 
per day and affirmatively allege that interest accrues only at 
the rate of Thirty-Two Dollars Sixty Cents ($32.60) per day. 
4. Defendants deny paragraph 4 of plaintiffs1 complaint. 
5. In answering paragraph 5 of plaintiffs1 complaint, 
defendants admit that the promissory notes sued upon were secured 
by a trust deed, but affirmatively allege that said trust 
deed includes properties and property descriptions which 
were never intended to be included by the defendants. 
This defense is more fully set forth in an affirmative 
defense hereafter. 
6. In answering paragraph 6 of plaintiffs1 complaint, 
defendants admit that an assignment of contract marked 
"Exhibit A" was attached to the complaint, and that a security 
agreement marked "Exhibit B" was attached to the complaint. 
Defendants affirmatively allege that they were induced and 
coerced into signing the assignment of contract by Joseph 
Henroid, and Earl J. Peck, agents for the plaintiffs, and 
that they unknowingly and unwittingly signed said assignment, 
and consequently, said assignment of contract is void and of 
no effect. 
7. In answering paragraph 7 of plaintiffs1 complaint, 
defendnats deny that the assignment of contract is valid and 
therefore, deny that the properties listed are subject to 
the assignment of contract. 
8. Defendants admit paragraphs 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 
13, and 14 of plaintiffs' complaint. 
9. In answering paragraph 15 of plaintiffs1 
complaint, defendants allege that plaintiffs are not entitled 
to foreclose on any property other than the One Hundred 
Sixty (160) acres and the Conk Ditch water right, and that 
no other property should be ordered sold or foreclosed by 
the Court. 
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THIRD DEFENSE 
10. By way of affirmative defense, defendants 
allege that Joseph L. Henroid, and Earl J. Peck, acting as 
agents for both the plaintiffs and the defendants, and while 
both were serving as attorneys for the defendants# breached 
their fiduciary duties and duties of disclosure to defendants, 
and as a result, plaintiffs are estopped from foreclosing on 
the trust deed, assignment of contract, and security agreement 
as presently written. 
FOURTH DEFENSE 
11. As a further affirmative defense, defendants 
allege that plaintiffs are estopped from proceeding in this 
action'by reason of their election of remedies in foreclosing 
upon the trust deed, and this action must be stayed until 
such time as the foreclosure of said trust deed is terminated. 
WHEREFORE, defendants pray that plaintiffs' complaint 
be dismissed and defendants be awarded thier costs for 
defending this action. 
COUNTERCLAIM 
For cause of action against the plaintiffs, the 
defendants allege as follows: 
1. At all times herein mentioned, Joseph L. 
Henroid was an agent of both the plaintiffs and the defendants, 
and, as a result, plaintiffs are bound by his conduct. 
2. At all times herein mentioned, Earl J. Peck 
was an agent of both the plaintiffs and the defendants, and 
as a result, plaintiffs are bound by his conduct. 
3. At the time of the signing of the trust deed, 
assignment of contract, and security agreement by defendants 
T. LAMAR and ALETHA DEWSNUP, defendants had retained Earl J. 
Peck and Joseph Henroid as their attorneys. 
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4. Henroid and Peck failed to fully advise the 
defendants of the nature of the transaction involved, failed 
to advise defendants that the trust deed included properties 
in addition to the One Hundred Sixty (160) acres, failed to 
advise defendants that they were assigning the contract of 
purchase referred to in plaintiffs' complaint, failed to 
advise defendants that they were signing a security agreement, 
and finally breached their fiduciary duty to the defendants 
in failing to fully disclose the nature of the transaction 
involved* 
5. As a result of such failures and breaches of 
fiduciary duty, defendants did not learn until June 1980, 
that additional property had been included on the trust 
deed, and that they had assigned their interest in the 
contract of purchase of ARROW INVESTMENT COMPANY, and that 
they had signed the secuirty agreement, 
6. By reason of such breaches of fiduciary duty 
and failure to disclose by their agents, plaintiffs are 
estopped from proceeding with any foreclosure action. 
7. Defendants are entitled to a judgment against 
plaintiffs reforming the trust deed to include only the One 
Hundred Sixty (160) acres and the Conk Ditch Irrigation 
Association water right, and defendants are entitled to a 
judgment vacating the assignment of contract and deleting 
all other properties from the trust deed. In addition, 
defendants are entitled to a judgment barring plaintiffs 
from proceeding on, or otherwise foreclosing on, any other 
properties other than the One Hundred Sixty (160) acres and 
the Conk Ditch Irrigation Association water right. 
8c By reason of the failure of disclosure and 
breach of fiduciary duty of the agents of the plaintiffs, 
-4~ 
defendants are entitled to a reasonable attorney's fee and 
costs of this action. 
WHEREFORE, defendants pray for judgment against 
the plaintiffs as follows: 
1. For a decree reforming the trust deed to 
include only the One Hundred Sixty (160) acres and the Conk 
Ditch Irrigation Association water right. 
2. For a decree vacating the assignment of contract 
Of the ARROW INVESTMENT contract. 
3. For a reasonable attorney's fee and costs of 
this action. . 
DATED this jf day of November, 1980. 
MAILING CERTIFICATE 
MAILED a true and correct cpy of the foregoing 
ANSWER and COUNTERCLAIM to Wendell E. Bennett, Attorney for 
Plaintiffs, 370 East 500 South, Suite 100, Salt Lake City, 
UT 84111, postage prepaid on this l^T^ay of November, 
1980. 
Secretary^^ 
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Sxwwr ^ 
WENDELL E. BENNETT 
AND ASSOCIATES 
Attorneys at Law 
Attorneys for Plaintiffs 
370 East 500 South, Suite 100 
Salt Lake Cityr Utah 84111 
Telephone: 532-7846 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT FOR MILLARD COUNTY 
STATE OP UTAH 
oooOooo 
LOUIS L. TIMM, et al. : SUMMARY JUDGMENT AND DECREE 
OF FORECLOSURE 
Plaintiffs, : 
vs. : 
T. LAMAR DEWSNUP, et al. : Civil No. 7191 
Defendants. : 
oooOooo 
The plaintiffs' motion for summary judgment against the 
defendants T. LaMar Dewsnup and Aletha Dewsnup having initially 
been set for hearing on Tuesday, March 17, 1981, and having been 
continued until Tuesday, April 14, 1981, at which time it was 
heard by the Honorable J. Harlan Burns, and having been supported 
by the unrebutted affidavit of Louis L. Timm, and the court being 
fully advised in the premises, and the court having examined the 
pleadings on file, now makes its 
DECREE OF FORECLOSURE AND ORDER OF SALE 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED: 
1. That there is now due and owing to the plaintiffs 
from the defendants T. LaMar Dewsnup and Aletha Dewsnup, the 
principal sum of $47,880.50, which is accruing interest at the 
rate of $23.61 per day from and after June 2, 1980, and the prin-
cipal sum of $2,085.71, which is accruing interest at the rate of 
$1.02 per day from and after June 7, 1980, which accrual of inter-
est shall continue until paid, together with $53.50 for court 
EX-OFFICIO CLERK OF THE 
DISTRICT COURT 
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costs, and $6,985.00 for the costs of collection, including 
attorney's fees, and plaintiffs are granted judgment against the 
defendants Dewsnup in said amount. 
2. That said sums are secured by the mortgage and 
security agreement described in paragraphs 7 and 8 in the plain-
tiffs' complaint, as well as the trust deed property described in 
paragraph 5 of the plaintiffs' complaint, and constitutes a lien 
on the secured premises, and water rights, more particularly 
described as: 
"All of the right, title, and interest of T. LaMar 
Dewsnup and Aletha Dewsnup, owned by them, or to which 
they have a right, under that certain agreement for the 
sale of real and personal property, by and between the 
Arrow Investment Company a limited partnership, as 
seller, and Thomas LaMar Dewsnup and Alice Aletha J. 
Dewsnup, as buyers, dated November 1, 1976, consisting 
of 6 parcels of land, more particularly described as 
follows: 
Parcel 1: That certain farm commonly known as the 
Curtis Farm, consisting of 177 acres, more or less, and 
described as the SW 1/4 of Section 8, T. 18 S., R. 7 W., 
SLB&M; and beq. at the NW corner of the SE 1/4 of said 
Section 8, thence S. 610 feet, thence E. 1218 feet, 
thence N. 610 feet, and thence W. 1218 feet to the point 
of beginninq. 
Parcel 2: That certain farm commonly known as the 
Greenwood i?arm, consisting of 89.93 acres, more or less, 
and described as beginning at the NW corner of Section 
18, T. 18 S., R. 7 W. SLB&M, thence E. 2010.5 feet, 
thence S. 150.8 feet, thence S. 75° 51' W. 332 feet, 
thence S. 30° 59* W. 601 feet, thence southerly to a 
point N. 4 2° 28' E. 133.9 feet from the SE corner of the 
SW 1/4 of the NW 1/4, thence S. 42° 28' W. 133.9 feet, 
thence westerly to the W. 1/4 corner of said Section 18, 
thence northerly to the NW corner of said Section, the 
place of beqinning. 
Parcel 3: That certain farm commonly known as the John 
Baker Farm, consistinq of 157.25 acres, more or less, 
and described as the E. 1/2 of the N.E. 1/4 and the E. 
1/2 of the S.E. 1/4 of section 13, T. 18 S., R. 8 W., 
SLB&M, less a strip 5 and 1/2 rods wide on the S. side 
of the SE 1/4 of the SE 1/4 of said section 13. 
Parcel 4: A part of that certain tract known as the 
Tamarack Forty, consisting of approximately 25 acres, 
more or less, and described as beqinning at the SW 
corner of the SE 1/4 of the SE 1/4 of section 12, T. 18 
S. R. 8 W., SLB&M, thence east to the middle or thread of 
the Baker Ditch, thence northerly along the middle or 
thread of said ditch to the intersection of said ditch 
with the Conk Ditch, thence due north to the existing 
fence located between said Conk Ditch and the White Top 
Ditch, thence easterly alonq said fence to the Conk 
Ditch, thence northeasterly along the middle or thread 
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of said Conk Ditch to the intersection with the north 
boundary of said SE 1/4 of the SE 1/4 of said section 
12, thence due west to the west boundary of said SE 1/4 
of the SE 1/4 of said section 12, thence due south to 
the point of beginning. In general terms, this tract is 
the westerly 25 acres, more or less, of said SE 1/4 of 
the SE 1/4 of said section 12. 
Parcel 5: A part of that certain tract known as the 
White Top Forty, consisting of approximately 30 acres 
more or less, and described as beginning at the SW 
corner of the NE 1/4 of the SE 1/4 of section 12, T. 18 
S., R. 8 W., SLB&M, thence due east to the intersection 
with Conk Ditch, thence northerly along the middle or 
thread of said ditch to the north boundary of said NE 
1/4 of the SE 1/4 of section 12, thence due west to the 
west boundary of said NE 1/4 of the SE 1/4 of said 
section 12, thence due south to the point of beginning. 
In general terms, this tract is the westerly 30 acres, 
more or less, of said NE 1/4 of the SE 1/4 of said 
section 12. 
Parcel 6: That certain farm commonly known as the Oley 
Black Farm, containing 78 acres, more or less, and 
described as the E. 1/2 of the N.W. 1/4 of section 12, 
T. 18 S., R. 8 W., SLB&M, less a stripe two rods in 
width on the E. side of said tract. 
and water rights as follows: 
570 shares of the capital stock of the Deseret 
Irrigation Company, a mutual water company, and; 
8 and 1/2 days of Conk Ditch secondary water right, 
beqinninq at 5:00 a.m. on the 23rd day of each month 
durinq the irrigation season and continuing until 5:00 
a.m. on the first day of the following month. This 
right is described as 8 and 1/2 days because that is the 
average monthly use, although the right consists of 8 
days during months with 30 days and 9 days during months 
with 31 days. This secondary right is satisfied after 
the primary right is satisfied and derives from the 
water right alotted and decreed to Joseph B. Dewsnup, 
Georqe W. Baker and Noah Rogers as described in the 
qeneral adjudication decree of the water rights of the 
Sevier River System in that certain case known and iden-
tified as Richlands Irrigation Company v. West View 
Irrigation Company, civil number 843, in the District 
Court in and for the Fifth Judicial District of the 
State of Utah in and for the County of Millard. 
In addition to the real property and water right above 
described, the followinq machinery and equipment is also 
a part of the security interest beinq foreclosed upon 
which was shown as Exhibit A to the contract, and is 
more particulary described as follows: 
A John Deere Combine; a Foraqe Harvester; a John Deere 
Tractor; a Case Tractor; a Minneapolis Moline Tractor 
(larqe); a Front End Loader (attached to Case Tractor): 
a Calf Table and Two Metal Gates; an International 
Harvester Combine; a Case Plow; a John Deere Baler; Two 
Hydraulic Chajt Waqons; Two Overhead Tanks {fuel and 
water, at Tamarack and Curtis); a Case Swather; a Handcock 
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Scraper; a Land Plane; a Self-Propelled Bale Wagon; 
Rough Lumber Stored in Steel Buildings; a Ford Cattle 
Truck; a Chevrolet Dump Flat Bed Truck; a leaf Cutter 
Bees and Field Stands. 
In addition to the foregoing real property, water 
rights, and personal property, there is also an addi-
tional water right which is subject to the security 
agreement, which is also being foreclosed in addition to 
the aforementioned real property, water rights, and per-
sonal property, more particularly described as follows: 
A water right of 4 days use per month during the growing 
season of the Conk Ditch Irrigation Association consist-
ing of 6.66 acre feet per hour between 5:00 a.m. of the 
25th and 5:00 a.m. of the 29th day of each month and all 
proceeds of sale for the disposition thereof. 
3. That said mortgage and collateral subject to the 
security agreement set out in the preceding paragraph is hereby 
foreclosed and it is ordered that the secured premises, water 
rights, and personal property be sold at public auction in the 
manner prescribed by statute by the sheriff of Millard County, 
subject to the interest of the Federal Land Bank of Berkley, 
Imperial Land Title Inc., as trustee and Eugene L. Carson and 
Elaine Carson as beneficiaries, Stringham, Mazuran, Larson and 
Sabin, a professional corporation, Mineral Fertilizer Company, 
Inc., and Harry V. Capps, no determination as to the relative 
priorities of any of said persons being established by the court 
at this time, and no rights of those persons or associations being 
determined by the court at this time, with the buyer of said 
property takinq it subject to the respective rights of the persons 
herein named. 
4. That said sheriff, after the time allowed by law for 
redemption has expired, shall execute a deed to the purchaser or 
purchasers at the sale, and if any of the parties to this action 
who may be in the possession of the premises, or a part thereof, 
or any person who since the commencement of this action shall 
refuse to deliver possession of the premises to such purchaser or 
purchasers on production of the deed for the premises, water 
riqhts, and personal property, or any part thereof, a writ of 
restitution may issue, without further notice, to compel such 
delivery to the purchaser or purchasers of the respective real 
property, waters riqhts, and personal property. 
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5. That the proceeds of the sale shall be applied as 
follows, in the following order: First, to the payment of the 
sheriff's fees, disbursements and costs of said sale? secondly, 
to the payment to the plaintiff of the principal sum of $47,880.50, 
with interest thereon at the rate of $23.61 per day from and after 
June 2, 1980, until paid, and the further principal sum of 
$2,085.71, with interest thereon at the rate of $1.02 per day from 
and after June 7, 1980, until paid; thirdly, to the payment to 
the plaintiffs of the costs of suit consisting of $53.50, and for 
$6,985.00 in collection costs including attorney's fees. 
6. In the event a deficiency shall become due to plain-
tiff after the application of the proceeds aforesaid, the court 
retains jurisdiction of this matter for the purpose of determining 
the amount of deficiency judgment to be awarded to plaintiff. 
7. That the defendants T. LaMar Dewsnup and Aletha 
Dewsnup and all persons claiminq under them, or any of them, after 
the filing of the notice of pendancy of this action, be and they 
are hereby forever barred and foreclose of all right, title, 
interest and equity of redemption in and to the secured premises, 
water rights, and personal property, and every party thereof, from 
and after the date of the delivery of the deed by the sheriff of 
Millard County. 
DATED this ^/V day of April, 1981. 
BY THE COUR$ 
I do hereby certify that I mailed a copy of the fore-
aoino on the /(j&day of April, 1981 to Robert C. Fillerup, 1325 
South 800 East, #305, Orem, Utah 84057. 
JJL^UU r. - A ^ f 
IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT ^ ^ L A B D COUNTY 
~~ IP* Clcrk 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH, IN AND FOR MILLARD 6©»NS¥ JZL Dc?ut> 
* * * * * * * * * * 
LOUIS L. TIMM, JOHN NEIUWLAND, 
and FLOYD M. CHILDS, Trustees 
of United Precision Machine and 
Engineering Co. Profit Sharing Trust; 
et al., 
Plaintiffs, Case Number 7191 
-VS- RAY M. HARDING, JUDGE 
T. LAMAR DEWSNUP and ALETHA 
DEWSNUP, ARROW INVESTMENT CO. 
a limited partnership, et al, 
Defendants. MEMORANDUM DECISION 
********** 
The Court having considered defendants7 motions to 
amend counterclaim and reconsider or certify as final hereby 
denies such motions. 
The Court finds that defendants' claims and their 
proposed amended counterclaim where denied in Judge Burn's 
judgment* Judge Burns7 judgment foreclosed the mortgage, 
acknowledged the existence of the trust deed and ordered the 
property sold to satisfy the amount due plaintiffs. It is 
implicit in Judge Burn's decision that he denied defendants' 
counterclaims because the counterclaims asserted that some of 
the property was not to be included in the amended trust 
deed; however, Judge Burns rejected that argument, granted 
judgment for the entire amount due plaintiffs and ordered the 
property to be sold. Because of this the Court finds that the 
judgment of Judge Burns was not interlocutory. 
This Court can not certify the above matter as final 
for appeal at this time when the matter was final over ten 
years ago. 
In regards to the defendants' motion to reconsider, 
the Court notes that no such motion exists under the Utah 
Rules of Civil Procedure. See, McKee v. Williams, 741 P.2d 
978 (1981), Peav v. Peay. 607 P.2d 841 (1980). 
Counsel for plaintiffs to prepare an order consistent 
with the terms of this decision and submit it to opposing 
counsel for approval as to form prior to submission to the 
court for signature. 
Dated this 21st day of February, 1991. 
cc: Michael Z. Hayes, Esq. 
Russel A. Cline, Esq. 
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MAZURAN, VERHAAREN & HAYES P . C . 
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IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OP MILLARD COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
LOUIS L. TIMM, JOHN 
NEIUWLAND and FLOYD M. 
CHILDS, Trustees of United 
Precision Machine and 
Engineering Co. Profit 
Sharing Trust, et al., 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
T. LAMAR DEWSNUP and 
ALETHA DEWSNUP, ARROW 
INVESTMENT CO., a limited 
partnership, et al., 
Defendants. 
ORDER DENYING DEFENDANT 
DEWSNUPS MOTIONS TO AMEND 
COUNTERCLAIM, RECONSIDER OR 
CERTIFY AS FINAL 
Case No. 7191 
Ray M. Harding, Judge 
The Court having considered Defendants' Motions to 
Amend Counterclaim and Reconsider or Certify as Final and 
having reviewed the file and the Memoranda in support of and 
opposing said motions and having entered its Memorandum 
Decision now makes the following findings and conclusions: 
1. It is implicit in Judge Burn's Judgment foreclosing 
the trust deed that Judge Burns denied defendants' 
counterclaims. 
2. Judge Burn's Judgment was a final judgment on the 
merits of the case which ordered the trust deed on the 
property foreclosedf acknowledge the existence of the trust 
deed and ordered the property sold to satisfy the amount due 
plaintiffs. 
3. The Court finds that Judge Burnfs Judgment was not 
interlocutory in nature and was a final appealable judgment 
some ten years ago. 
4. In regards to Defendants Motion to Reconsider the 
Court finds that no such Motion exists under the Utah Rules 
of Civil Procedure. 
WHEREFORE, based upon the foregoing, IT IS HEREBY 
ORDERED that Defendants Motions to Amend Counterclaim and 
Reconsider or Certify as Final are denied with prejudice. 
DATED this // day of March, 1991. 
APPROVED AS TO FORM: 
{U^<^i A* &£>* 
RUSSELL A. CLINE 
